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PARKER V. BROWN, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, AND
ANTICOMPETITIVE STATE REGULATION
WILLIAM H. PAGE* & JOHN E. LOPATKA**
ABSTRACT
The Parker v. Brown (or “state action”) doctrine and the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution impose different limits on antitrust
suits challenging anticompetitive state regulation. The Supreme
Court has developed these two versions of state sovereign immunity
separately, and lower courts usually apply the immunities independ-
ently of each other (even in the same cases) without explaining their
relationship. Nevertheless, the Court has derived the two immunities
from the same principle of sovereign immunity, so it is worth
considering why and how they differ, and what the consequences of
the differences are for antitrust policy. The state action immunity is
based on statutory interpretation of the Sherman Act; the Court has
shaped the doctrine over seventy-five years, guided by both consider-
ations of state sovereignty and antitrust policy, so it should reflect a
balance of these two critical variables. The Eleventh Amendment
immunity, by contrast, has nothing specifically to do with antitrust
policy; it is a general constitutional doctrine based on state sover-
eignty, with some acknowledgment of the demands of general federal
authority. Our concern is that the application of the broader
immunity can thwart the balance between state sovereignty and
antitrust policy reflected in the antitrust-specific immunity.
There are many differences between the immunities, but the only
significant area of concern is in the subset of cases in which Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies but the state action immunity does
not—cases, in other words, in which the Supreme Court has chosen
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to deny Parker immunity to state-connected actors, in part because
of considerations of antitrust policy. In those cases, the antitrust-
specific version of sovereign immunity does not protect the state
actors from damage liability, but the Eleventh Amendment immunity
does. Is that a problem? To make a long story short, we conclude that
the effect of the conflict on consumer welfare is probably small,
because of the Eleventh Amendment immunity’s own limitations, and
because of adaptations that public and private enforcers can make in
case of a conflict. The outcome may, entirely by accident, be efficient.
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INTRODUCTION
The Parker v. Brown1 (or “state action”) doctrine and the Eleventh
Amendment of the Constitution2 impose different, sometimes
conflicting, limits on antitrust suits challenging anticompetitive
state regulation. The Supreme Court created these two versions of
sovereign immunity in long, separate lines of cases, but has said
almost nothing yet about the doctrines’ relationship to each other.3
Lower courts have applied both doctrines in antitrust challenges to
state regulation, but have also never explained the relationship
between the doctrines, other than to say that the immunities apply
independently of each other.4 The lower courts’ approach is under-
standable: both immunities are convoluted and controversial, so
any effort to reconcile them or to fully explain their relationship is
likely to be problematic.5 It is simpler to apply their standards sep-
arately to dispose of the claims each new case raises.
Nevertheless, the Court has derived both doctrines from the
principle of sovereign immunity, so it is worth considering how and
why they differ, and what the consequences of the differences are for
antitrust policy. In this Article, we consider two important issues,
1. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”).
3. See Susan Beth Farmer, Balancing State Sovereignty and Competition: An Analysis
of the Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine, 42 VILL. L.
REV. 111, 169 (1997) (“The Supreme Court has not focused on either the interplay between
the state action doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment or the inherent conflicts between the
two doctrines.”). The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case in which the
appellate court held that the state-action doctrine, unlike the Eleventh Amendment, is a
defense to liability rather than an immunity from suit, but the Court later dismissed the
petition pursuant to a stipulation of the parties. See SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project
Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720, 726 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. dismissed, 138 S.
Ct. 1323 (2018).
4. See, e.g., Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326, 329 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (“[S]overeign immunity [under the Eleventh Amendment] and Parker immunity are
distinct doctrines, providing different—if sometimes overlapping—spheres of protection.”).
5. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 169 (“Although state entities have had the option of
pleading both the Eleventh Amendment and state action immunity, the number of antitrust
decisions that discuss both doctrines is surprisingly, relatively small, and generally, these
decisions do not discuss the relationship between the two doctrines of state sovereign
immunity.”).
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one under each doctrine. The antitrust issue—our primary focus—is
whether application of the Eleventh Amendment in cases involving
anticompetitive state regulatory choices reduces consumer welfare.6
The state action immunity is based on statutory interpretation of
the Sherman Act;7 the Court has shaped the doctrine over decades,8
guided by both sovereignty and antitrust considerations, so the
doctrine should reflect an appropriate balance between the two.9
The Eleventh Amendment immunity, by contrast, has nothing
specifically to do with antitrust policy; it is a general constitutional
doctrine that protects state sovereignty, while acknowledging the
needs of general federal authority.10 Our concern is that the ap-
plication of the broader immunity is a blunt instrument that may
thwart the balance between state sovereignty and antitrust policy
reflected in the antitrust-specific immunity. Ultimately, we conclude
that the effect of the conflict on consumer welfare is probably small,
because of the constitutional doctrine’s own limitations and because
of adaptations that state governments and public and private
enforcers can make in case of a conflict.
That conclusion has implications for the second issue: whether,
as some scholars have argued, the Roberts Court’s expansion of
Eleventh Amendment immunity has improperly intruded on federal
legislative power.11 The antitrust experience is unique, because,
unlike other federal legislative policies, antitrust’s relationship to
the Eleventh Amendment is overshadowed by its own immunity,
which is also based on state sovereignty, and is in some ways
broader. But the relatively minor practical consequences of the
6. For discussion of earlier cases, see generally Farmer, supra note 3.
7. See William J. Martin, State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised
Parties, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1079, 1081 (2005).
8. The state action doctrine is typically traced to 1943, when the Supreme Court decided
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351-52, 362-63 (1943), though the doctrine was foreshadowed
by Olsen v. Smith, 195 U.S. 332, 341, 344-45 (1904) (holding that the antitrust laws did not
invalidate state statutes requiring a license to perform marine pilotage services and fixing
pilotage fees). The Court decided its most recent state action case in 2015. See N.C. State Bd.
of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107 (2015).
9. See Farmer, supra note 3, at 114-15.
10. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
11. Some have argued (without discussing antitrust law) that the Roberts Court’s
sovereign immunity decisions impede the ability of Congress to advance important national
policies. See, e.g., Daniel J. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: Five Authors in Search of a
Theory, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1011, 1012 (2000). 
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conflict between the immunities in antitrust litigation lends some
support for the view that the expanded Eleventh Amendment im-
munity imposes no insurmountable barrier to the enforcement of
federal law.12 As we show in Part III, one can argue that the limited
Eleventh Amendment immunity is an efficient supplement to Par-
ker immunity.
 Part I of this Article provides an overview of the two immunities:
state action and the Eleventh Amendment. In Part II, we compare
the sources and natures of the two immunities. In Part III, we
show how the definitions of the two immunities affect their appli-
cability to different state-connected entities and individuals in
antitrust cases. At the same time, we consider whether the differ-
ences between the doctrines make a significant difference for anti-
trust policy. We show that the primary practical effect of Eleventh
Amendment immunity is to limit private plaintiffs to prospective
relief in antitrust suits against state officials. That effect is sig-
nificant, however, only in the subset of cases in which Eleventh
Amendment immunity applies but the state action immunity does
not—cases, in other words, in which the Supreme Court has chosen
not to shelter state-connected actors with Parker immunity, in part
because of considerations of antitrust policy. In cases such as these,
the antitrust-specific version of sovereign immunity does not shield
the state actors from damage liability,13 but the Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity does.14 We consider the extent to which this lim-
itation on remedies in antitrust cases is likely to reduce consumer
welfare in ways that conflict with antitrust policy. We conclude by
considering the significance of this assessment for the scope of the
two immunities.
12. See Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, Who’s Afraid of the Eleventh Amendment? The
Limited Impact of the Court’s Sovereign Immunity Rulings, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 213, 215
(2006) (arguing that criticisms of the Rehnquist Court’s Eleventh Amendment cases overstate
the effect of these cases on enforcement of federal policy).
13. Congress acted to protect local governments and their officials from damage liability
but not equitable remedies in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984 (LGAA), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 34-36 (2012), after the Court adopted an interpretation of the state action doctrine that
exposed these government actors to damage liability. See infra notes 178-86 and
accompanying text. 
14. See infra Part III.B.
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I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TWO IMMUNITIES
The Eleventh Amendment and state action immunities are both
expressions of the ancient principle of state sovereignty and its
correlative principle of sovereign immunity.15 But the Supreme
Court has also drawn on other policies to formulate their content.
A. State Action
First consider the antitrust-specific state action immunity. In
Parker, the Supreme Court refused to apply the Sherman Act to
invalidate a state-created agricultural prorationing scheme.16 The
Court did not believe that Congress, by enacting Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in 1890, meant to intrude on states’ sovereign
regulatory powers as extensively as the requested remedy would
entail:
[I]t is plain that the prorate program here was never intended
to operate by force of individual agreement or combination. It
derived its authority and its efficacy from the legislative
command of the state and was not intended to operate or become
effective without that command. We find nothing in the lan-
guage of the Sherman Act or in its history which suggests that
its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of govern-
ment in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their
authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over
its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.17
Under Parker, sovereignty is a constitutional attribute of state
government, but it does not directly immunize states or their
15. See generally Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign
Immunity, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1963) (describing the history of sovereign immunity in
England and America, and noting that by 1268 “it was settled doctrine that the King could
not be sued eo nomine in his own courts”).
16. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 352 (1943).
17. Id. at 350-51 (emphasis added).
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officers.18 Instead, it functions as a background norm that requires
a limiting construction of the Sherman Act. Because the doctrine
excludes state-created restraints from the reach of the statute,19
state action immunity forecloses any suits challenging covered re-
straints, whether brought by private antitrust plaintiffs, such as the
raisin producer in Parker,20 or public antitrust enforcers, such as the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC)21 or the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in later cases.22 Also notice that the quoted passage makes
clear that the state action immunity applies not only to the agen-
cies, but to their officials—both are immune or not immune in the
same circumstances.23 And because the immunity is based on an
inference about congressional intent, Congress is presumably free
both to expand the immunity and to restrict it by more explicit
legislation.24
18. Id. at 359-60.
19. See id. at 350-51.
20. See id. at 344, 368.
21. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108-10, 1117
(2015) (applying the state action doctrine to a case brought by the FTC for a violation of the
Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) and holding that the state action doctrine does not
provide immunity to a state board controlled by active market participants absent active
supervision); FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 222, 227 (2013) (applying
state action doctrine to a case brought by the FTC for violation of the FTC Act and the
Clayton Act § 7 and finding immunity absent for lack of clear state policy authorizing
restraint); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 635 (1992) (noting that state action immunity
had been considered in cases brought under the Sherman Act, and holding that the state
action doctrine applied in this case brought by the FTC under the FTC Act).
The FTC does not claim that it can preempt state law any more broadly under the FTC Act.
See Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. at 635 (“[T]he Commission does not assert any superior pre-
emption authority in the instant matter [than would exist under the Sherman Act].”); see also
N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1107-10 (applying the state action doctrine to an action brought
by the FTC, but finding that the board was not entitled to state action immunity because it
did not receive active supervision); Phoebe Putney, 568 U.S. at 222, 224-25 (recognizing state
action immunity in suit brought by the FTC only when the standards were satisfied). For a
recent argument that the FTC should have “superior preemption authority,” see Daniel A.
Crane & Adam Hester, State-Action Immunity and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 115 MICH. L.
REV. 365, 367-68 (2016).
22. See, e.g., S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 50, 65-
66 (1985) (finding rate bureaus were entitled to state action immunity in suit brought by the
DOJ). 
23. See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
24. See id.
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Anticompetitive state regulation “involve[s] a blend of private and
public decisionmaking.”25 The issue under Parker has been what
degree and form of state involvement justifies immunity.26 A key
determinant has been the proximity of the defendant to the state as
a sovereign: the closer the defendant is to the state’s three consti-
tutional branches, the fewer the conditions it must satisfy to
warrant immunity.27 The Court has recognized three main catego-
ries of protection. First, if the defendant is itself a coordinate branch
of state government or its members, such as the state supreme court
(or in some courts’ views, an executive branch department),28 it is
“ipso facto” immune from antitrust liability for anticompetitive acts
attributed to it under Hoover v. Ronwin.29 The Court has stated the
25. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592 (1976).
26. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1110.
27. See id. at 1110-11 (“An entity may not invoke Parker immunity unless the actions in
question are an exercise of the State’s sovereign power.... Parker immunity requires that the
anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors ... result from procedures that suffice to make
it the State’s own.”); John E. Lopatka, The State of “State Action” Antitrust Immunity: A
Progress Report, 46 LA. L. REV. 941, 956-57, 1038 (1986).
28. Several lower courts have suggested that ipso facto immunity extends to high-level
executive branch departments and agencies. See, e.g., Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. New
England Newborn Screening Program, 187 F.3d 24, 29 (1st Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have rejected a
‘clear articulation’ test as applied to the state’s executive branch, at least where a full-fledged
department is concerned.”); Charley’s Taxi Radio Dispatch Corp. v. SIDA of Haw., Inc., 810
F.2d 869, 876 (9th Cir. 1987) (“We conclude that state executives and executive agencies, like
the state supreme court, are entitled to Parker immunity for actions taken pursuant to their
constitutional or statutory authority, regardless of whether these particular actions or their
anticompetitive effects were contemplated by the legislature.”); Deak-Perera Haw., Inc. v.
Dep’t of Transp., 745 F.2d 1281, 1283 (9th Cir. 1984) (“We see no reason why a state executive
branch, when operating within its constitutional and statutory authority, should be deemed
any less sovereign than a state legislature, or less entitled to deference under principles of
federalism.”); see also VIBO Corp. v. Conway, 669 F.3d 675, 687 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that
state attorneys general were entitled to automatic state action immunity when they were not
functioning as market participants). But see Builders Flooring Connection, LLC v. Brown
Chambless Architects, LLC, No. 2:11cv373-MHT, 2014 WL 197679, at *4 (M.D. Ala. Jan. 16,
2014) (observing that Supreme Court precedents have cast “serious doubt” on the conclusion
“that state-level executive officials and agencies, like the state legislature and supreme court,
are ipso facto immune”). The Supreme Court expressly declined to decide whether a state
governor is entitled to automatic immunity. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 568 n.17
(1984). However, a governor’s acts are presumably immune. See, e.g., Fuchs v. Rural Elec.
Convenience Coop., Inc., 858 F.2d 1210, 1214 (7th Cir. 1988) (“A state’s governor’s acts are
also presumably immune, although the Court has yet to say so.” (internal citation omitted)).
29. 466 U.S. at 573 (holding that a state bar committee’s grading formula for the bar
examination was immune because it was “in reality” an exercise of the state supreme court’s
sovereign powers); see also N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1110 (“State legislation and
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principle of automatic immunity in absolute terms: these state
actors’ actions are, by definition, uniquely governmental decisions
and are presumed to have been taken in the service of some positive
value.30 To the extent the actions respond to market failures, they
are not antithetical to the antitrust laws; to the extent they serve an
alternative value, they are not a naked repudiation of the policies
of antitrust law, but a recognition that the action is ancillary to the
state’s choice of another positive value.31 If the state’s choice is un-
wise, it is still the choice of the state itself, and it is subject to
correction by the political process.32
Second, if the defendant is a municipality or a “prototypical state
agency”33 (or its officials), it is immune under Town of Hallie v. City
of Eau Claire34 so long as its actions are taken pursuant to a policy
that the state as sovereign has clearly articulated—for example, by
legislation.35 The “clear articulation” test means that the state must
‘decision[s] of a state supreme court, acting legislatively rather than judicially,’ will satisfy
this standard, and ‘ipso facto are exempt from the operation of the antitrust laws’ because
they are an undoubted exercise of state sovereign authority.” (alteration in original) (quoting
Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567-68). Because all anticompetitive restraints are the product of multiple
decisionmakers, a court must determine whether a particular restraint should be attributed
to the relevant constitutional state actor. Hoover, 466 U.S. at 569 (“[T]he first critical step in
our analysis must be to determine whether the conduct challenged here is that of the [state
supreme] court.”).
30. See Hoover, 466 U.S. at 567-68; John E. Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and
the Meaning of Agreement Under the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20
YALE J. ON REG. 269, 275 (2003).
31. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 30, at 277.
32. See William H. Page & John E. Lopatka, State Regulation in the Shadow of Antitrust:
FTC v. Ticor Title Insurance Co., 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 189, 193-94 (1993).
33. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1114 (distinguishing “prototypical state
agencies” from “specialized boards dominated by active market participants”); Century
Aluminum of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 278 F. Supp. 3d 877, 886, 889 (D.S.C. 2017)
(finding that a state-owned electric utility controlled by a board of political appointees, not
active market participants, was not subject to an active supervision requirement), appeal
docketed, No. 17-2192 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2017); Turner v. Va. Dep’t. of Med. Assistance Servs.,
230 F. Supp. 3d 498, 507 (W.D. Va. 2017) (finding that a state Department of Medical
Assistance Services was a “prototypical state agency” entitled to Hallie immunity).
34. 471 U.S. 34, 43-44 (1985) (holding that a city’s policy for extension of sewage services
to neighboring areas was pursuant to a clearly articulated statutory authorization and
therefore immune from antitrust challenge); see also City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor
Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) (concluding that a city’s zoning activities were immune
because they were a foreseeable result of the state’s authorizing statutes). 
35. See Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39-40; see also FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc.,
568 U.S. 216, 227 (2013) (“[S]tate-action immunity applies if the anticompetitive effect was
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give the municipality “the express authority to take action that
foreseeably will result in anticompetitive effects.”36 Congress went
further in the Local Government Antitrust Act,37 which immunizes
local governments and their agents acting in an official capacity
from all antitrust damage claims.38 This sort of immunity is only
necessary, of course, if the defendants’ actions actually violate an-
titrust law, which not all regulatory programs do.39 For example, a
municipal rent control ordinance, according to the Court, did not
violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act because the ordinance fixed
prices by a unilateral act of the city, not by any private agreement.40
Third, if the defendant is a private individual or corporation, then
its actions are immune from antitrust liability if the regulatory
scheme meets the familiar two-part test set out in California Retail
Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.: the defendant’s
actions must be both (1) taken pursuant to a clearly articulated
state policy, and (2) actively supervised by a qualified state actor,
the ‘foreseeable result’ of what the State authorized.”).
36. Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 43.
37. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (2012) (“No damages, interest on damages, costs, or attorney’s fees
may be recovered under section 4, 4A, or 4C of the Clayton Act ... from any local government,
or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.”); id. § 36(a) (“No damages,
interest on damages, costs or attorney’s fees may be recovered under section section 4, 4A, or
4C of the Clayton Act ... in any claim against a person based on any official action directed by
a local government, or official or employee thereof acting in an official capacity.”).
38. Then-Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Community Communications Co. v. City of
Boulder, argued that “questions involving the so-called ‘state action’ doctrine are more
properly framed as being ones of pre-emption rather than exemption.” 455 U.S. 40, 62 (1982)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist argued that state and local regulations that
conflict with the Sherman Act are preempted under the Supremacy Clause. See id. at 61.
Under this view, the regulatory actions of a municipality, or presumably a state agency, are
simply ineffectual: the governmental entity does not violate the antitrust laws and cannot be
liable for damages. See id. at 68-69. The Court’s unwillingness to adopt Justice Rehnquist’s
analysis led Congress to enact the LGAA. See W. Scott Campbell, Note, Antitrust Immunity:
The State of “State Action”, 88 W. VA. L. REV. 783, 812-13 (1986).
39. See, e.g., Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 266-67 (1986); cf. Mass. Food Ass’n
v. Mass. Alcoholic Beverage Control Comm’n, 197 F.3d 560, 564-66 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding in
facial challenge that, because state statute prohibiting ownership of more than three liquor
stores did not compel or authorize a per se antitrust violation and was therefore not
preempted in the abstract, dismissal was appropriate regardless of state action immunity).
40. Fisher, 475 U.S. at 270 (“Because under settled principles of antitrust law, the rent
controls established by Berkeley’s Ordinance lack the element of concerted action needed
before they can be characterized as a per se violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act, we cannot say
that the Ordinance is facially inconsistent with the federal antitrust laws.” (emphasis
omitted)).
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usually a regulatory agency.41 The doctrine thus immunizes only
private actions “that, in the judgment of the State, actually further
state regulatory policies.”42 Most recently, the Court held in North
Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC that Midcal’s two-
part standard for immunity also applies to specialized professional
regulatory boards that are controlled (as many are)43 by private
practitioners in the profession.44
If a state or municipal entity is entitled to Parker immunity, its
actions are immune, even if they can plausibly be attributed to a
conspiracy of state officials with private interests.45 For instance, if
41. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1980)
(holding that the state’s statutory resale price maintenance system was not immune; although
it was implemented pursuant to a clearly articulated policy, the state did not actively
supervise resale prices set by private actors).
42. Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100-01 (1988) (holding that physicians were not
immune for their actions on hospital peer-review committees, because they were not actively
supervised by the state); see also LaFaro v. N.Y. Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 480
(2d Cir. 2009) (“Although granting an exclusive contract to a private party is not itself a per
se antitrust violation, a private party is not exempted from the ‘active supervision’ prong of
the Midcal test simply by virtue of purporting to act pursuant to a contract with a
governmental entity that itself would be entitled to state action immunity.” (emphasis
omitted)). 
43. Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Foxes at the Henhouse: Occupational Licensing Boards Up
Close, 105 CALIF. L. REV. 1567, 1570 (2017) (reporting that 85 percent of licensing boards “are
required by statute to be comprised of a majority of currently licensed professionals, active
in the very profession the board regulates”).
44. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015). As one court
recently summarized the tiers of immunity:
[T]he Supreme Court has established the following principles: ipso facto [Hoover]
immunity applies to state legislatures and state supreme courts, but not to
entities that are state agencies for limited purposes; Midcal scrutiny applies to
private parties and state agencies controlled by active market participants; and
Hallie scrutiny applies to municipalities, and perhaps state agencies.
Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567, 573, 575 (3d Cir.
2017) (emphasis omitted) (concluding that a state university foundation must be judged under
Hallie immunity); see also Century Aluminum of S.C., Inc. v. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth., 278 F.
Supp. 3d 877, 884 (D.S.C. 2017) (recognizing the same “three-part doctrine”), appeal docketed,
No. 17-2192 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 2017). Edinboro qualified its attribution of Hallie immunity to
state agencies because the Supreme Court has only applied immunity to state agencies in
dicta. See Edinboro, 850 F.3d at 573 (“In cases in which the actor is a state agency, it is likely
that active state supervision would also not be required, although we do not here decide that
issue.” (quoting Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 n.10 (1985))). In North
Carolina State Board, the Supreme Court quoted this dictum to distinguish the “specialized
boards dominated by active market participants” at issue there from an “electorally ac-
countable municipality,” which resembled “prototypical state agencies.” 135 S. Ct. at 1114.
45. See, e.g., City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374-75 (1991).
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a governmental entity acts pursuant to valid zoning authority un-
der state law to impose restrictions that benefit powerful local in-
terests, its actions are immune.46 There is no “conspiracy” exception
that would impose antitrust liability if the entity were highjacked
by private influence.47 Rejecting such an exception, the Court in
Omni reasoned that, because “it is both inevitable and desirable
that public officials often agree to do what one or another group of
private citizens urges upon them, such an exception would virtually
swallow up the Parker rule: All anticompetitive regulation would
be vulnerable to a ‘conspiracy’ charge.”48
The state action immunity thus does not rest on an implausible
assumption that governmental actors always or even normally act
in the public interest.49 This immunity assumes only that Congress
intended states to have the authority to make regulatory choices
when they assume political responsibility for the costs of regula-
tion. The threat of political “punishment” by electoral or other
means provides a deterrent, however imperfect, to subverting the
public interest, and political accountability at least assures that po-
litical representatives bear the responsibility for decisions to dis-
place competition. And, of course, Congress can reverse those state
choices by legislation more specific than the Sherman Act.50
Significantly, given our later focus on remedies in this Article, the
state action doctrine also does not distinguish between actions for
damages and actions for injunctions: if the immunity is not avail-
able to the state or local agency, all remedies are on the table.51 The
46. See id. at 370-71, 374-75.
47. See id. at 374-75.
48. Id. at 375.
49. Even apart from the private-interest dominance scenario, governments may have
perverse incentives. Courts have recognized that governments may have parochial interests
that give them an incentive to permit anticompetitive behavior within their borders, if the
costs fall primarily on other states or countries. See, e.g., Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683
F.3d 845, 860 (7th Cir. 2012) (“The host country for [an international] cartel will often have
no incentive to prosecute it.”). They have also recognized that governmental defendants do not
represent all of the interests of private actors within their boundaries equally. See, e.g.,
Kleissler v. U.S. Forest Serv., 157 F.3d 964, 973-74 (3d Cir. 1998) (recognizing that a
government agency “represents numerous complex and conflicting interests” and that
“straightforward business interests” of private entities “may become lost in the thicket of
sometimes inconsistent governmental policies”).
50. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
51. As noted earlier, Congress in the LGAA amended the antitrust laws to protect local
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Court has suggested that private parties can be held liable for anti-
trust damages despite acting pursuant to apparent state authority,
if the conditions for immunity are not met.52 If the immunity is
present, however, it precludes actions for all types of relief.53
A doctrine related to, but separate from, state action holds that
a statute may be preempted by the Sherman Act pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause54 if the statute on its face mandates or authorizes
conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust laws
in all cases, or if it places irresistible pressure on a private party to
violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute.55
“Such condemnation will follow under § 1 of the Sherman Act when
the conduct contemplated by the statute is in all cases a per se vi-
olation.”56 Conduct that is taken pursuant to a statute that is not
preempted in the abstract may or may not be illegal under the rule
of reason.57
To summarize, under Parker, antitrust law is a federal policy
favoring competition, but it is “subject to supersession by state
regulatory programs” when they substitute “[a]ctual state involve-
ment,” not “fiat” or private action under the state’s “general
governments and individuals connected to them from damage liability, regardless of clear
articulation by the state. See supra note 37 and accompanying text. The LGAA thus removes
the prospect of damage liability that would otherwise be available under the state action
doctrine.
52. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-98 (1976) (suggesting that a
regulated utility could be held liable for antitrust damages for a free light-bulb program the
utility chose to adopt, even though a state public service commission had approved it); see also
Lopatka, supra note 27, at 968-70.
53. Cohn v. Bond, 953 F.2d 154, 158 (4th Cir. 1991) (“[The] State Action Doctrine
immunity precludes injunctive relief in this case. If an action falls within this doctrine, it is
immunized from antitrust scrutiny.”).
54. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
55. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 659-61 (1982).
56. Id. at 661 (emphasis omitted). California’s designation statute, which prohibited state
liquor importers from importing a distiller’s product if the distiller had not authorized them
to do so, was not preempted because it only authorized conduct that might be illegal under
the rule of reason. See id. at 661-64.
57. See id. at 662 & n.8 (observing that the manner in which a party utilizes a
nonpreempted statute is subject to Sherman Act analysis and might be found unreasonable
or even per se illegal). Vertical price fixing, that between a manufacturer and a dealer, for
example, is not per se illegal. See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 907 (2007) (repudiating the per se rule against vertical price restraints and holding them
subject to the rule of reason).
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auspices.”58 The antitrust standard constrains private action; the
state may choose to supersede that constraint, but only by taking
ultimate responsibility for the choices. The levels of scrutiny for
the different levels of state government correspond to the extent to
which the defendant has authority to make choices on behalf of
the state as sovereign.59 The doctrine thus reflects concerns of both
state sovereignty and antitrust law in drawing the line between
unduly private on the one hand and sufficiently public on the other.
B. The Eleventh Amendment
Now consider Eleventh Amendment immunity, and how it differs
from Parker immunity. The express language of the Amendment
excepts from the “[j]udicial power of the United States” actions
against a state “by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.”60 On its face, and in the view of some
modern Justices61 and scholars,62 this language only eliminates one
category of diversity jurisdiction conferred by Article III of the
Constitution.63 But, under the Supreme Court’s interpretation, the
immunity is not simply a limitation on the federal courts’ subject
matter jurisdiction,64 even though courts often resolve the issue on
58. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins., 504 U.S. 621, 632-33 (1992).
59. See supra note 44.
60. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
61. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 289 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“The language of the Eleventh Amendment, its legislative history, and the
attendant historical circumstances all strongly suggest that the Amendment was intended to
remedy an interpretation of the Constitution that would have had the state-citizen and state-
alien diversity clauses of Article III abrogating the state law of sovereign immunity on state-
law causes of action brought in federal courts.”).
62. John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Constitutional
Texts, 113 YALE L.J. 1663, 1721 (2004) (“[T]he Court should enforce an amendment as written
if one could imagine rational reasons, pragmatic or political, for a precisely drawn text like
the Eleventh Amendment to have taken the shape that it did.”). 
63. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, ... between a State and Citizens of another State.”).
64. See Floyd v. Thompson, 227 F.3d 1029, 1035 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court has
indicated that the Eleventh Amendment occupies its own unique territory.”); see also Parks
v. Va. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Child Support Enf’t Servs., No. 1:16-cv-568 (JCC/TCB), 2016 WL
4384343, at *2 (E.D. Va. Aug. 17, 2016) (noting that it is unclear whether Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity should require dismissal for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but ultimately choosing to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(1)), aff’d, 672 F. App’x 281 (4th Cir. 2016); Trantham v. Henry Cty. Sheriff’s
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a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).65
According to the Court, “Eleventh Amendment immunity” is actual-
ly a misnomer, because the amendment itself is just one expression
of an expansive doctrine of sovereign immunity that
neither derives from, nor is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh
Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution’s structure, its history,
and the authoritative interpretations by this Court make clear,
the States’ immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by
virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing
with the other States) except as altered by the plan of the
Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.66
This amorphous immunity applies to far more than the single
category of diversity jurisdiction the Eleventh Amendment de-
scribes. It applies to actions in federal court under any source of
Office, No. 4:10CV00058, 2011 WL 863498, at *3 (W.D. Va. Mar. 10, 2011) (“Although subject
matter jurisdiction and sovereign immunity do not coincide perfectly, there is a recent trend
among the district courts within the Fourth Circuit to consider sovereign immunity under
Rule 12(b)(1) [and authorize dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction].”), aff’d, 435 F.
App’x 230 (4th Cir. 2011); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, What Is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?,
106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1700-01 (1997).
65. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(1); see supra note 64.
66. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999) (emphasis added); see also Blatchford v.
Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) (“[W]e have understood the Eleventh
Amendment to stand not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition of our
constitutional structure which it confirms: that the States entered the federal system with
their sovereignty intact; that the judicial authority in Article III is limited by this sovereignty;
and that a State will therefore not be subject to suit in federal court unless it has consented
to suit, either expressly or in the ‘plan of the convention.’” (internal citations omitted));
Bradford R. Clark, The Eleventh Amendment and the Nature of the Union, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1817, 1819, 1822 (2010) (arguing that the text of the Amendment implements the framers’
assumption that Congress had no legislative power to coerce states directly); cf. Thomas D.
Rowe, Jr., Exhuming the “Diversity Explanation” of the Eleventh Amendment, 65 ALA. L. REV.
457, 460-62 (2013) (observing that reading the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on
diversity jurisdiction “does not abolish state sovereign immunity, but rather unpins it from
the Eleventh Amendment” and leaves it to federal common law and broader constitutional
doctrine (emphasis omitted)).
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Article III jurisdiction—federal question,67 diversity,68 or admiral-
ty.69 It applies to actions under federal law by citizens of a state
against the same state in the state’s own courts.70 Indeed, it applies
to actions under either state or federal law in any forum, including
federal administrative agencies.71 Other characteristics of the im-
munity distinguish it from limitations on subject matter jurisdic-
tion. States may lose the immunity by waiver or by consenting to
suit, explicitly or implicitly,72 which would not be possible for other
categories of federal subject matter jurisdiction.73 A court is also
67. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1890) (holding Eleventh Amendment
immunity barred a citizen from suing Louisiana in federal court on a claim that state statutes
violated the Contract Clause). 
68. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (“While the Amendment by its
terms does not bar suits against a State by its own citizens, this Court has consistently held
that an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens
as well as by citizens of another State.” (emphasis added)); see also Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 53 (1994) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“[The Eleventh Amendment]
when read in light of the historical evidence, is properly understood to mean that the grant
of diversity jurisdiction found in Article III, § 2, does not extend to actions brought by
individuals against States.”). 
69. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 498 (1921) (holding that the Eleventh
Amendment does not “leave open a suit against a State in the admiralty jurisdiction by
individuals, whether its own citizens or not”).
70. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (“We hold that the powers delegated to Congress under Article
I of the United States Constitution do not include the power to subject nonconsenting States
to private suits for damages in state courts.”).
71. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002) (holding a state
agency was immune from a claim before the Federal Maritime Commission that the agency
had violated the federal Shipping Act).
72. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 535 U.S. 613, 619 (2002)
(holding that a state waived Eleventh Amendment immunity by voluntarily removing a suit
to federal court); Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (“Many States, on their own initiative, have enacted
statutes consenting to a wide variety of suits. The rigors of sovereign immunity are thus
‘mitigated by a sense of justice which has continually expanded by consent the suability of the
sovereign.’” (citation omitted)); Nair v. Oakland Cty. Cmty. Mental Health Auth., 443 F.3d
469, 474 (6th Cir. 2006) (observing that a state may waive the Eleventh Amendment
immunity defense in several ways in litigation). But cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678
(1974) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment defense sufficiently partakes of the nature of a
jurisdictional bar so that it need not be raised in the trial court” if it is properly raised on
appeal.).
State action immunity may also be waived. See, e.g., Bolt v. Halifax Hosp. Med. Ctr., 874
F.2d 755, 756 (11th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam) (holding that the defendant medical
center waived state action immunity by withdrawing the claim of immunity on oral argument
in the court of appeals); Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 988 F. Supp. 127, 188 n.61
(W.D.N.Y. 1997).
73. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671 (2009) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction
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not required to consider an Eleventh Amendment defense if it has
not been raised,74 though the court may do so in its discretion.75
Eleventh Amendment immunity limits not only adjudicative
power but also congressional legislative power. It is a constitutional
attribute of state sovereignty that Congress cannot abrogate under
its Commerce Clause power,76 as Congress can do with state action
immunity.77 The only mechanisms open to Congress to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity have no practical application to
antitrust.78 This limitation on congressional power has significance
for our argument because it means that Congress cannot limit the
cannot be forfeited or waived and should be considered when fairly in doubt.”).
74. See Wis. Dep’t of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381, 389 (1998); see also Nicholl v. Bd. of
Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 706 F. App’x 493, 495 (11th Cir. 2017) (per curiam) (“While the
Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment is not jurisdictional in the sense that
courts must address the issue sua sponte, it has held that Eleventh Amendment immunity is
in the nature of a jurisdictional bar.”).
75. See Higgins v. Mississippi, 217 F.3d 951, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2000).
76. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996) (holding that Congress
may not abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity using the Article I power to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll.
Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999) (“Seminole Tribe makes clear that Congress may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I powers; hence the Patent Remedy
Act cannot be sustained under either the Commerce Clause or the Patent Clause.”).
77. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350 (1943) (stating the assumption that “Congress
could, in the exercise of its commerce power, prohibit a state from maintaining” an
anticompetitive program); see also Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 605 (1976)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (“No one denies that Congress could, if it wished, override those
state laws whose operation would subvert the federal policy of free competition in interstate
commerce.”). The congressional power to override anticompetitive state laws is the power to
limit state action immunity. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
78. There are two avenues available to Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity,
neither of which has been used in antitrust cases. Congress can extract a state’s consent to
liability as a condition of receiving federal funds provided under the Spending Power. See, e.g.,
Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 285, 293 (2011) (holding that, though states may waive
immunity by accepting funds provided under the Spending Power, waiver of damage liability
must be explicit). And Congress can abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to
its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. Even
acting under its Fourteenth Amendment power, Congress will be understood to have
abrogated sovereign immunity only if it makes its intent clear. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415
U.S. 651, 675-78 (1974) (holding that Congress did not abrogate Eleventh Amendment
immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1983 pursuant to its power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment). Further, even when its intent is clear, Congress may not
constitutionally abrogate immunity unless it is acting under Section 5 to remedy conduct
violating the substantive guarantees of Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Coleman
v. Court of Appeals of Md., 566 U.S. 30, 36 (2012) (plurality opinion); Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of
Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 364-65 (2001). 
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Eleventh Amendment’s restrictions on private antitrust enforce-
ment—although it can add new, legislative immunities in circum-
stances in which the Eleventh Amendment does not apply.
According to some courts, although Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity protects the state from suit, state action immunity only protects
it from liability.79 Whether a court makes this distinction has im-
portant procedural implications. An interlocutory decision by a dis-
trict court to deny a motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity from
suit is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine;80
a denial of a motion to dismiss on grounds of immunity from lia-
bility is only appealable after the court issues a final order, at which
point the decision will usually have become moot.81 In addition, un-
der this distinction, the filing of a motion to dismiss on Eleventh
Amendment grounds, but not one on state action grounds, justifies
an immediate stay of discovery.82
79. SolarCity Corp. v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvement & Power Dist., 859 F.3d 720,
726 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that the state action doctrine, unlike the Eleventh Amendment,
provides immunity from liability but not suit), cert. dismissed, 138 S. Ct. 1323 (2018); S.C.
State Bd. of Dentistry v. FTC, 455 F.3d 436, 444 (4th Cir. 2006) (same). But see Danner
Constr. Co. v. Hillsborough County, 608 F.3d 809, 812 n.1 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he immunity
asserted here includes immunity from suit.”); Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub.
Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1040 (5th Cir. 1998) (“State action is properly treated as
an immunity from suit.”); Martin v. Mem’l Hosp. at Gulfport, 86 F.3d 1391, 1395 (5th Cir.
1996) (concluding that the state action doctrine, like Eleventh Amendment immunity,
provides an entitlement “not to stand trial” (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525
(1985))); Commuter Transp. Sys., Inc. v. Hillsborough Cty. Aviation Auth., 801 F.2d 1286,
1289 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that Parker “provide[s] immunity from suit rather than a mere
defense to liability” (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. See Earles, 139 F.3d at 1036 (noting that, under the collateral order doctrine, the court
has jurisdiction to consider interlocutory appeal from denial of state action immunity);
Martin, 86 F.3d at 1397 (same); Askew v. DCH Reg’l Health Care Auth., 995 F.2d 1033, 1036-
37 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); Commuter Transp. Sys., 801 F.2d at 1290 (holding that denial of
summary judgment sought by an entity on the basis of state action immunity is “an
appealable ‘collateral order’”).
81. SolarCity, 859 F.3d at 727 (holding that a district court decision rejecting the state
action defense is not immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine); S.C. State
Bd., 455 F.3d at 441-45 (same); Huron Valley Hosp., Inc. v. City of Pontiac, 792 F.2d 563, 568
(6th Cir. 1986) (same).
82. Digital Ally, Inc. v. Taser Int’l, Inc., No. 16-cv-2032-CM-TJJ, 2016 WL 5944497, at *3-
4 (D. Kan. Oct. 13, 2016) (recognizing that earlier cases had “stayed discovery during the
pendency of a dispositive motion in which a government defendant ha[d] asserted sovereign,
judicial, or Eleventh Amendment immunity,” but refusing to do so based on a private
defendant’s assertion of Parker immunity).
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As broadly as the Court has described the Eleventh Amendment
immunity, and as jealously as the Court has guarded it, the im-
munity is subject to crucial limitations. First, as mentioned earlier,
the state can waive Eleventh Amendment immunity, just as it can
waive state action immunity.83 Second, it applies only to actions by
private plaintiffs, because the states are thought to have consented
to suit by the federal government and other states as a condition of
joining the union.84 By contrast, as we have seen, the state action
immunity applies to both public and private plaintiffs because it
limits the substantive reach of the antitrust statutes.85
Third, and perhaps most important for our purposes, Eleventh
Amendment immunity is limited by the peculiar doctrine of Ex parte
Young,86 which permits private suits under federal law against state
agency officials acting in their official capacity, even if the agency
itself is immune from suit.87 The Young exception applies only to
actions for prospective relief, such as an injunction or declaratory
judgment, against an official with authority to enforce the relevant
state law;88 the Young exception does not apply if the relief sought
is “tantamount to an award of damages for a past violation of
federal law, even though styled as something else.”89 Although the
83. See supra note 72.
84. See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (1987) (holding that the
Court’s decisions hold “dispositively that States retain no sovereign immunity as against the
Federal Government”); Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 328-29 (1934)
(observing that “[s]tates by the adoption of the Constitution” waived their exemption from
federal judicial power in suits by other states and that “[w]hile [federal] jurisdiction [over
suits by the United States against a state] is not conferred by the Constitution in express
words, it is inherent in the constitutional plan”).
85. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
86. See 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
87. See id. at 159-60.
88. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974) (“[A] federal court’s remedial
power, consistent with the Eleventh Amendment, is necessarily limited to prospective
injunctive relief and may not include a retroactive award which requires the payment of funds
from the state treasury.” (internal citations omitted)); Conrad v. Bevin, No. 3:17-CV-00056-
GFVT, 2018 WL 988071, at *8 (E.D. Ky. Feb. 16, 2018) (finding that the Young exception did
not apply to a suit against the state attorney general, who did not have authority to enforce
statutes governing a state licensing board), appeal docketed sub nom. Conrad v. Beshear, No.
18-5609 (6th Cir. June 12, 2018).
89. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986). So, for example, an action for restitution
of illegally withheld benefits payments is barred, even if plaintiffs characterize it as an
equitable remedy. See, e.g., Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (characterizing the action as similar to
a damages remedy because it would likely be paid from state funds).
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Young doctrine is based on a dubious, if not incoherent, view of the
role of agency officials, it is considered necessary to prevent state
officials from acting unconstitutionally.90 It implies that the Elev-
enth Amendment functionally, if not formally, is a remedial doc-
trine that limits the means of asserting federal challenges to the
policy choices of states, but “does not bar all judicial review of state
compliance with the Constitution and valid federal law,”91 even in
private litigation.
Eleventh Amendment immunity applies only if the agency acts
as an “arm of the State.”92 The Court has suggested that this char-
acterization depends primarily on whether any judgment against
the agency would have to be satisfied out of the state treasury,93
but it also depends on whether requiring the agency to litigate
would offend the state’s “dignity.”94 Lower courts have formulated
90. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) (noting,
in dicta, “the ‘well-recognized irony’ that an official’s unconstitutional conduct constitutes
state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the Eleventh Amendment”); James
Leonard, Ubi Remedium Ibi Jus, or, Where There’s a Remedy, There’s a Right: A Skeptic’s
Critique of Ex Parte Young, 54 SYRACUSE L. REV. 215, 235 (2004) (“Officer suits exist because
judges cannot stomach the fact that a rigorously and logically applied rule of sovereign
immunity would reward lawless conduct by government, and they wish to give private
litigants redress for illegal government actions.”).
91. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999). Ex parte Young may not lift the Eleventh
Amendment bar when Congress has created “a detailed remedial scheme for the enforcement
against a State of a statutorily created right.” Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44,
74 (1996). But the antitrust laws do not contain such a scheme.
92. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977).
93. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 48-51 (1994) (noting that the
“impetus for the Eleventh Amendment” was “the prevention of federal-court judgments that
must be paid out of a State’s treasury,” and denying immunity to a bi-state port authority in
part because it was financially self-sufficient); Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 280-81 (denying
Eleventh Amendment immunity to a local school board, in part because under state law it was
more like a county than a state agency); see also Edinboro Coll. Park Apartments v. Edinboro
Univ. Found., 850 F.3d 567, 571 & n.2 (3d Cir. 2017) (“Plaintiffs did not sue the University,
conceding that the University is an arm of the state subject to immunity under the Eleventh
Amendment.”). Indeed, even a suit for damages against a state officer in his individual
capacity is barred if the relief sought would come from the state treasury. Alden, 527 U.S. at
757.
94. See Hess, 513 U.S. at 39-40, 47 (“[C]urrent Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence
emphasizes the integrity retained by each State in our federal system .... It thus accords the
States the respect owed them as members of the federation.” (internal citations omitted)); Ex
parte Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505 (1887) (“The very object and purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment were to prevent the indignity of subjecting a State to the coercive process of
judicial tribunals at the instance of private parties.”); see also Fitchik v. N.J. Transit Rail
Operations, Inc., 873 F.2d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 1989) (identifying three factors in determining the
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multifactor tests to determine whether an entity qualifies as an
arm of the state under these standards. For example, the Fifth Cir-
cuit analyzed several factors, such as:
(1) whether the state, through statutes or case law, views the
entity as an arm of the state; (2) the source of the entity’s
funding; (3) whether the entity is concerned with local or
statewide problems; (4) the entity’s degree of authority inde-
pendent from the state; (5) whether the entity can sue and be
sued in its own name; and (6) whether the entity has the right
to hold and use property.95
These criteria can differ significantly from the various requirements
for state action immunity. A county or municipality, for example,
may be immune under Parker if it acts pursuant to a clearly ar-
ticulated state policy to regulate sewage96 or billboards,97 even if it
would be too autonomous to be considered an arm of the state for
Eleventh Amendment purposes.98 The standards are closer for en-
tities entitled to ipso facto state action immunity under Hoover.99
application of the Eleventh Amendment to an entity: “(1) [w]hether the money that would pay
the judgment would come from the state ...; (2) [t]he status of the agency under state law ...;
and (3) [w]hat degree of autonomy the agency has”).
95. Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1037 (5th Cir.
1998); see also Bolden v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 953 F.2d 807, 816 (3d Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(Alito, J.) (articulating the same test the court specified in Fitchik).
96. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 43 (1985) (holding a municipality
immune for actions taken pursuant to a state’s authorization “to provide sewage services”
with “the express authority to take action that foreseeably will result in anticompetitive
effects”).
97. City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advert., Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 373 (1991) (“The very
purpose of zoning regulation is to displace unfettered business freedom in a manner that
regularly has the effect of preventing normal acts of competition, particularly on the part of
new entrants.”).
98. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) (holding that, under the
Eleventh Amendment, “jurisdiction was limited only in respect to those cases in which the
State is a real, if not a nominal defendant; and while the county is territorially a part of the
State, yet politically it is also a corporation created by and with such powers as are given to
it by the State.... [So] it is a part of the State only in that remote sense in which any city,
town, or other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the State.”); see also Bd. of
Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 369 (2001) (“[T]he Eleventh Amendment does
not extend its immunity to units of local government. These entities are subject to private
claims for damages under [federal law] without Congress’ ever having to rely on § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to render them so.” (internal citation omitted)).
99. See, e.g., Rosenberg v. Florida, No. 15-22113-Civ-Lenard/Goodman, 2015 WL
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We are left with a mix of similarities and differences between the
two immunities that make generalizing about them difficult. One
might ask, having read thus far, which immunity is the greater
barrier to the use of federal judicial or legislative power as a check
on states’ authority. On the one hand, the Eleventh Amendment
immunity appears to be stronger, because it shields states from
claims under all federal (and state) statutes;100 Congress cannot
alter it under its commerce power,101 and it immunizes the state
from suit, not simply liability.102 None of these characteristics are
true of Parker immunity. On the other hand, Eleventh Amendment
immunity is weaker, because it only applies to private lawsuits,
although it allows an exception for prospective relief in a suit
against agency officials;103 Parker immunity, in contrast, forecloses
all public and private plaintiffs from any type of relief.104 These
latter distinctions are the reason we suggest that the Eleventh
Amendment is primarily a remedial doctrine. Nevertheless, given
the importance of private damage actions in the enforcement of
antitrust policy, the limitations of the Eleventh Amendment are
worthy of closer examination.
II. THE TWO IMMUNITIES AND ANTITRUST POLICY
Both immunities constrain federal antitrust claims challenging
anticompetitive state regulation, and the scopes of both depend in
part on the nature of the named defendant and its relationship to
the state. But standards of the two doctrines produce substantially
different spheres of immunity. The differences have practical effects,
which in turn raise policy questions. In this Part, we examine those
practical and policy consequences by considering the four categories
of cases that raise questions under these immunities: (1) actions
that are subject to both immunities; (2) actions that are subject to
13653967, at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2015) (finding that a state bar was not required to satisfy
the two-prong Midcal test in an action for injunctive relief for an antitrust violation because
it was “an arm of the state (a sovereign entity)”).
100. See supra note 71 and accompanying text.
101. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
103. See supra notes 84-89 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 19-22 and accompanying text.
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state action immunity but not Eleventh Amendment immunity;
(3) actions (alleging violations by state-connected actors) that are
subject to neither immunity; and (4) actions that are subject to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity but not state action immunity. As ex-
plained more fully below, it is only the last category that poses a
risk that Eleventh Amendment immunity will subvert antitrust pol-
icy.105 We can illustrate these categories by the following diagram,
in which a circle illustrates the actions subject to immunity under
each doctrine. The areas in which one, both, or neither of the im-
munities apply are designated with letters corresponding to the
Sections of this Part in which we consider that category of actions:
Because of the relative complexity of the two doctrines, we begin
each section with a positive discussion of the differing scopes of the
two immunities in order to clarify their actual and potential ap-
plicability in antitrust cases. Those clarifications, we hope, will be
a worthwhile exercise in themselves, as well as a starting point for
the rest of our argument. They might be useful, for example, if they
assist legislatures in deciding how to shape their regulatory mech-
anisms to bring them within, or exclude them from, one or both of
the immunities, and they might conceivably assist a future Con-
gress that decides to limit antitrust liability or remedies to increase
a state’s regulatory autonomy. The most important intrinsic benefit
of the taxonomy, however, relates to litigation: it may help courts
apply the immunities and public and private litigants choose claims
or defenses tailored to the requirements of the immunities.106 As we
105. See infra Part III.A.
106. Courts sometimes conflate the tests of Eleventh Amendment and state action
immunities, perhaps in part because litigants purposely or inadvertently confuse them. See,
e.g., Nicholl v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 706 F. App’x 493, 496 (11th Cir. 2017)
(finding that the board of regents of a state university system was “outside the ambit” of the
Sherman Act because it was “an arm of the state”); Jackson v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health, No.
3:15-CV-750 (CSH), 2016 WL 3460304, at *13 (D. Conn. June 20, 2016) (concluding that a
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will see, litigants still unaccountably waive available claims or de-
fenses by failing to assert them.107
In the same discussions, we will consider the extent to which the
conflicts between the doctrines pose a significant challenge for anti-
trust policy. In doing so, we take as given (for now) the basic con-
tours of Eleventh Amendment immunity, whatever the theoretical
infirmities of the Court’s constitutional analysis. We also largely ac-
cept (for now) the framework of state action immunity the Court has
developed over the last seventy years. Our objective, again, is to
evaluate the consequences of the differences between the two im-
munities before drawing any possible lessons about their effects on
antitrust policy.
The tension between the immunities arises because the Eleventh
Amendment immunity is a constitutional doctrine that embodies a
value that transcends any particular area of law, including anti-
trust. It constrains courts and federal agencies from hearing cases
against state entities when doing so would infringe state sover-
eignty.108 State action immunity, by contrast, is a statutory doc-
trine whose terms are shaped by both the general principle of state
sovereignty and the policies of the Sherman Act.109 In the Parker
framework, sovereignty is a norm that counsels a limiting inter-
pretation of the Sherman Act’s substantive reach when the regula-
tory action is demonstrably an expression of state policy, but not
when it is private anticompetitive behavior with only a veil of state
involvement.110 It immunizes some state-connected anticompetitive
state department of health and two of its officials “are entitled to sovereign immunity
pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment as to a Sherman Act claim,” and citing as support a
First Circuit case and two Second Circuit cases applying the test for state action immunity),
appeal dismissed, No. 16-2282, 2017 WL 6759304 (2d Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 1326
(2018).
107. See, e.g., Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15CV831, 2017 WL 401234,
at *1, *4 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017). In Henry, plaintiff physical therapists alleged that the
defendant licensing board and some of its members violated section 1 of the Sherman Act by
determining that “dry needling” was a form of acupuncture that physical therapists could not
practice without a license to practice acupuncture. See id. at *2-4. The plaintiffs sought both
injunctive relief and treble damages. See id. at *4. The defendants moved to dismiss for failure
to state a claim without, apparently, raising the issue of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See
id. at *10, *14.
108. See supra Part I.B.
109. See supra Part I.A.
110. See supra Part I.A.
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behavior, but intentionally leaves other state-connected behavior
subject to antitrust liability.111 The differing rationales of the doc-
trines predictably produce significantly different criteria for ap-
plicability.
The critical question is this: In what circumstances does Eleventh
Amendment immunity disrupt the antitrust policy balance implicit
in the scope of state-action immunity? Interestingly, most categories
of overlapping and differing immunities pose few such challenges,
as we show below. However, state regulatory actions subject to Elev-
enth Amendment immunity but not state action immunity—the last
category we consider—do pose a challenge because of the Eleventh
Amendment’s effect on antitrust remedies.112
This discussion addresses the outcomes in the application of the
two immunities. Defendants may assert both immunities, and the
parties will have to address both in pretrial motions. The Supreme
Court may then have to consider both—not least because of an
important potential difference in the treatment of the two immuni-
ties in pretrial procedure. As we noted earlier, the Eleventh Amend-
ment immunizes the state from suit, so it is subject to special pro-
cedural protections.113 For example, if the defendant moves to dis-
miss on Eleventh Amendment grounds, it is typically entitled to a
stay of discovery until the motion is resolved;114 if it loses the mo-
tion, it is typically entitled to interlocutory appellate review.115
Under at least one view, state action immunity receives neither
form of exceptional treatment.116
A. Actions Subject to Both Immunities
In this Section, we are concerned with actions against state-
connected defendants in which the conditions for both immunities
are met. Both immunities share a concern with the links between
the state “as sovereign” and the defendant entity. Consequently,
both immunities apply most clearly to private actions against the
111. See supra Part I.A.
112. See infra Parts II.D, III.A.
113. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
116. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
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state itself or a coordinate branch of state government. Those ac-
tors, which are entitled to “ipso facto” state action immunity, are
undoubtedly also entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, be-
cause they are self-evidently also arms of the state.117
For executive branch agencies that are not themselves executive
departments, both immunities apply, but in different ways. Elev-
enth Amendment immunity applies to agencies that act as arms of
the state—a standard that encompasses a wide range of agencies
with, for example, no independent funding power and little auton-
omy.118 State action immunity also applies to some of these agen-
cies.119 For some courts, Hallie immunity applies to agencies acting
based on clearly articulated standards contemplating the challenged
conduct, a category that includes many of the agencies that are
arms of the state under Eleventh Amendment standards.120
Agencies dominated by private practitioners may still be arms of the
state and immune under the Eleventh Amendment,121 and may also
117. See Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984) (“[W]hen a state legislature adopts
legislation, its actions constitute those of the State and ipso facto are exempt from the
operation of the antitrust laws.” (internal citation omitted)); see also Ammar v. L.A. City Coll.,
727 F. App’x 412, 413 (9th Cir. 2018) (dismissing pro se antitrust claims against a state
college district on Eleventh Amendment grounds); Kennedy v. Maine, No. 1:18-cv-00339-GZS,
2018 WL 4489459, at *1-2 (D. Me. Sept. 19, 2018) (dismissing a pro se antitrust claim against
the state of Maine (for monopolizing the practice of law) on Eleventh Amendment grounds);
Campbell v. Othoff, No. 4:15-cv-00143, 2016 WL 1066287, at *3 (D.N.D. Feb. 17, 2016)
(holding that the Director of the state Department of Corrections was immune from damage
liability under both the Eleventh Amendment and Parker).
118. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
119. Cf. Heppler v. Pa. Liquor Control Bd., No. 10-3430, 2011 WL 2881221, at *7, *9 & n.7
(E.D. Pa. July 18, 2011) (holding the state liquor board immune as an arm of the state, and
suggesting in dicta that it would also be immune under Parker, either ipso facto or because
of clear state articulation). 
120. See, e.g., Jackson, Tenn. Hosp. Co. v. W. Tenn. Healthcare, Inc., 414 F.3d 608, 611-14
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that a hospital district created only by state law was subject to the
clear articulation requirement for immunity); Turner v. Va. Dep’t of Med. Assistance Servs.,
230 F. Supp. 3d 498, 505-06 (W.D. Va. 2017) (holding that the state health department was
a “prototypical state agenc[y]” and therefore not subject to active supervision requirement);
In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust Litig., No. 08-md-2002, 2016 WL 4771865, at *8 (E.D.
Pa. Sept. 12, 2016) (finding the state department of agriculture was not subject to active
supervision requirement because it was “more analogous to the municipality discussed in ...
Hallie, as opposed to either the North Carolina Dental Board in [North Carolina State Board]
or the Virginia State Bar in Goldfarb”).
121. See, e.g., Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (refusing to apply the active supervision requirement of state action immunity to
Eleventh Amendment immunity of a state regulatory board allegedly dominated by private
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be immune under state action, if they satisfy both prongs of the
Midcal test.122
For agencies to which they apply, both immunities protect agency
officials, but with differing scopes and effects. Agency officials are
as fully protected by state action immunity as is the agency itself.123
Ex parte Young withholds Eleventh Amendment immunity from
agency officials sued in their official capacities only when they have
authority to enforce the relevant state law, and, most significantly,
only when they are sued for wholly prospective relief.124 Conse-
quently, agency officials who are sued for retroactive relief are
immune under both standards.
In all of these cases in which both immunities apply, Eleventh
Amendment immunity poses no problems for antitrust policy, be-
cause state action immunity is more encompassing. State action
immunity denies all relief against both the agency and its officials,
while Ex parte Young would permit an action for injunctive relief
against state-empowered agency officials.125 A paradigmatic ex-
ample is a state regulatory agency and its officials, not dominated
by private interests, acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state
policy.126 Such an agency and its officials would be immune from any
liability under Parker, and the agency would be immune from
practitioners); Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-CV-59-D, 2017 WL 696721, at *5-6
(E.D.N.C. Feb. 21, 2017) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars Jemsek’s claims against the
NCMB,” independently of North Carolina State Board), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 234 (4th Cir. 2017).
122. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
124. See Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) (discussing difference between relief
that is wholly prospective and can be obtained under Young and relief that is tantamount to
damages and is prohibited); supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
125. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) (“The general discretion regarding the
enforcement of the laws when and as he deems appropriate is not interfered with by an
injunction which restrains the state officer from taking any steps towards the enforcement
of an unconstitutional enactment to the injury of complainant.”); supra notes 103-04.
126. See, e.g., Campbell v. Othoff, No. 4:15-cv-00143, 2016 WL 1066287, at *3 (D.N.D. Feb.
17, 2016) (“[A]ny claim against defendant Bertsch in her official capacity as [Director of the
State Department of Corrections] for antitrust violations is a claim against the State for
which the State has Eleventh Amendment immunity as to any claim for damages” and the
defendant “would also have state-action (“Parker”) immunity .... because Bertsch is the
Director of the NDDOCR, which is a department of the State and not a board comprised of
otherwise private active market participants” such as the board in North Carolina State
Board).
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damage liability under the Eleventh Amendment.127 Because Parker
is the broader immunity, it would not matter that Young would per-
mit prospective relief against the agency’s officials—Parker would
protect the agency and its officials from all antitrust remedies.128
B. Actions Subject to Parker, but Not Eleventh Amendment,
Immunity
In this Section, we are concerned with actions against state-
connected actors in which the conditions for Parker immunity are
met, but the conditions for Eleventh Amendment immunity are not
met. Eleventh Amendment immunity only protects agencies that are
“arms of the state,” a standard that is not met by municipalities and
most other local governmental bodies.129 State action immunity,
however, applies (1) to municipalities when they act pursuant to a
clearly articulated state policy, and (2) to private individuals, if they
act pursuant to such a policy and under active state supervision.130
Consequently, no action against either private or local governmental
defendants enjoys Eleventh Amendment immunity, but state action
immunity does apply when its standards are satisfied.131
Even where it applies, Eleventh Amendment immunity does not
block suits against state agency officials acting in their official
capacity for wholly prospective relief.132 State action immunity, by
contrast, applies to agency officials to the same extent as to the
agencies themselves, foreclosing all relief.133 Consequently, actions
127. See id.
128. See supra notes 23, 86-89 and accompanying text.
129. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
130. See Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105
(1980); see also Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985).
131. See, e.g., Pa. Coach Lines, Inc. v. Port Auth. of Allegheny Cty., 874 F. Supp. 666, 669
n.1, 671 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (finding that the port authority was a state agency for purposes of
state action immunity, but not for Eleventh Amendment immunity; if the port authority was
a municipality, it was immune under Hallie).
132. Nat’l Child Support, Inc. v. Hayes, No. 1:02-CV-928, 2005 WL 1075029, at *6 (S.D.
Ohio Apr. 18, 2005).
133. Parker itself was a case against an agency official, and the passage we quoted
previously refers directly to the immunity of agency officials. See supra note 17, 23 and
accompanying text; see also Nat’l Child Support, 2005 WL 1075029, at *8-9 (dismissing
antitrust claims against the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services and its officials
under the state action doctrine). 
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against state agency officials for injunctive relief may be subject to
state action immunity, even if Ex parte Young would withhold Elev-
enth Amendment immunity for that remedy.134
A recent example of this category of cases is Allibone v. Texas
Medical Board, in which a practitioner of “complementary and
alternative medicine” sued the state medical board and its members
for damages and an injunction alleging antitrust claims arising from
disciplinary proceedings based on his unorthodox form of practice.135
The board moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim.136 The district court held that both the
board and its members were entitled to Eleventh Amendment im-
munity, but the immunity for the board’s members did not extend
to the physician’s claim for injunctive relief against a continuing
violation of the Sherman Act.137 Nevertheless, the court reasoned
that “any immunity gap from the Ex Parte Young rule is covered by
Parker immunity,” which “applies to a plaintiff’s request for pro-
spective relief.”138 The court assumed that, because most of the
board’s members were practicing physicians,139 the board had to
meet both requirements of the Midcal standard.140 Nevertheless, the
court held the regulatory scheme indeed met both requirements, so
any disciplinary action would “promote[ ] state policy” instead of the
board members’ private interests.141
134. See, e.g., Earles v. State Bd. of Certified Pub. Accountants of La., 139 F.3d 1033, 1039,
1044 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding, before North Carolina State Board, that the state accounting
board and its members were entitled to state action immunity, even though the individual
members of the board were not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity under Ex parte
Young).
135. No. A-17-CA-00064-SS, 2017 WL 4768224, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 20, 2017), appeal
docketed, No. 17-50984 (5th Cir. Nov. 7, 2017).
136. Id.
137. Id. at *2-3; see also Pharm. & Diagnostic Servs., Inc. v. Univ. of Utah, 801 F. Supp.
508, 512-14 (D. Utah 1990) (concluding that the University of Utah was entitled to both
Eleventh Amendment immunity from damages and state action immunity from injunction).
138. Allibone, 2017 WL 4768224, at *3.
139. See Texas Medical Board Overview, TEX. MED. BOARD, http://www.tmb.state.tx.us/
page/medical-board [https://perma.cc/NT7S-BK5P].
140. Allibone, 2017 WL 4768224, at *3.
141. Id. (quoting N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1116 (2015)).
State law satisfied the clear articulation requirement by giving the board “broad power to
regulate medical professionals,” including by professional discipline. Id. It satisfied the active
supervision requirement by providing that disciplinary hearings would be “before an inde-
pendent Administrative Law Judge, subject to judicial review” under statutory standards. Id.
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In cases such as Allibone and actions against most municipalities,
the Eleventh Amendment again poses no obstacle for antitrust pol-
icy. Despite Eleventh Amendment immunity, an entity itself (if it is
a municipality) or its officials (if it is a state agency) are both subject
to suit, at least for injunctive relief.142 They are nevertheless en-
tirely immune under the state action doctrine, if the regulatory
scheme meets the doctrine’s requirements.143 For those agencies,
state action immunity determines whether the agency would be
liable for any form of relief. In such cases, state action immunity is
solely the result of the Supreme Court’s choices in accommodating
antitrust standards to state sovereignty; the action is anticompeti-
tive, but its costs are fully attributable to a state’s sovereign choices.
C. Actions (Against State-Connected Actors) Not Subject to Either
Immunity
In this short Section, we touch on actions against state-connected
entities and their officials or regulated individuals that do not meet
the conditions for immunity under either the Eleventh Amendment
or state action doctrine. Here, still more obviously, Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity does not conflict with antitrust policy. For example,
if a municipality acts without a clearly articulated state policy
authorizing its action, it is not protected by the state action doctrine
or the Eleventh Amendment.144 Similarly, if a regulated private ac-
tor violates the Sherman Act without clear state authorization or
sufficiently active state supervision, the actor would be subject to
all public and private remedies.145 Moreover, in Parker, the Court
142. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677
(1974); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
143. Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 40 (1985); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S.
341, 350-51 (1943).
144. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 756; Town of Hallie, 471 U.S. at 40.
145. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 581-83, 598 (1976) (holding that a
public utility, found not to have state action immunity for conduct described in a tariff
approved by the state utilities commission, could be held liable for treble damages); id. at 614-
15 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“The Court today holds that a public utility company, pervasively
regulated by a state utility commission, may be held liable for treble damages under the
Sherman Act for engaging in conduct which, under the requirements of its tariff, it is
obligated to perform.”); cf. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S.
97, 105 (1980).
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instructed that “a state does not give immunity to those who violate
the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful.”146 A statute that simply declared price-
fixing by firms in a favored industry to be lawful would be a naked
repeal of antitrust law, and it would confer no immunity on the pri-
vate actors who fixed prices.147 The law would be preempted because
it “authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the
antitrust laws in all cases.”148 And, of course, the Eleventh Amend-
ment would have no application to private defendants.149 In all of
these cases, there is no conflict between the immunities or threat to
antitrust policy.
D. Actions Subject to Eleventh Amendment, But Not Parker,
Immunity
To complete the picture, in this Section, we consider actions in
which state-connected entities meet the conditions for Eleventh
Amendment immunity but would be subject to antitrust liability
under the Parker criteria. In some instances, Eleventh Amendment
immunity is more inclusive than state action immunity. For ex-
ample, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies broadly to all exec-
utive branch agencies that act as arms of the state.150 It applies both
to high-level state departments and to lesser boards and state
entities, such as some state-supported universities that meet the
criteria to be arms of the state.151 By contrast, only those executive
146. Parker, 317 U.S. at 351.
147. In Midcal, for example, a state authorized wine producers and distributors to impose
resale price schedules, with no regulatory supervision. Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, 445
U.S. at 99, 105-06. The Court denied immunity because “[t]he national policy in favor of
competition cannot be thwarted by casting such a gauzy cloak of state involvement over what
is essentially a private price-fixing arrangement.” Id. at 106.
148. Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
149. See Toranto v. Jaffurs, 297 F. Supp. 3d 1073, 1082, 1102-03 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (holding
that a physician who allegedly made false representations about the plaintiff in peer review
proceedings was not protected by either immunity).
150. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Maliandi v. Montclair State Univ., 845 F.3d 77, 85 (3d Cir. 2016) (recognizing
that federal circuit courts “have almost uniformly concluded that state-affiliated universities
are arms of their respective States” but noting that “each state university exists in a unique
governmental context, and each must be considered on the basis of its own peculiar
circumstances” (internal quotations omitted)). Again, we are considering only actions in which
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branch state agencies that satisfy the requirements set out in either
Hoover or Hallie, whichever is applicable,152 are entitled to state
action immunity.153 Eleventh Amendment immunity would apply to
an agency acting as an arm of the state, even if it authorizes or
commits a per se antitrust violation without clear legislative au-
thority to do so and therefore lacks state action immunity.154 Ex
parte Young would permit actions against agency officials in their
official capacities for prospective relief; actions for damages in
those circumstances would be foreclosed.155
For example, in TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, the plaintiff sought to
prevent state officials from enforcing the state’s regulation of liquor
distribution, which required wholesalers to post and adhere to their
prices and prohibited them from offering volume discounts.156 The
court found that the scheme was a public-private “hybrid restraint”
because the post-and-hold requirement granted wholesalers “a sig-
nificant degree of private regulatory power,” and the volume dis-
count ban “reinforce[d] the post-and-hold system by making it even
more inflexible.”157 The regulatory system was a per se antitrust
violation, and it was not protected by the state action doctrine
because the state failed to actively supervise the price-setting
conduct of private parties.158 Nevertheless, Eleventh Amendment
the agency is violating substantive antitrust standards. If the agency’s action is unilateral or
cannot violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act for some other substantive reason, the agency
would be protected from antitrust liability, irrespective of either type of immunity.
152. See supra notes 25-40 and accompanying text.
153. A state agency, other than perhaps one treated as the executive branch of government,
has no state action immunity unless it is acting in accordance with and pursuant to a clear
policy articulated by a constitutional branch of government. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 445
U.S. 773, 789-92 (1975) (holding that the state bar, though a state agency, did not have state
action immunity because its conduct was not authorized by state statute or supreme court
rule). 
154. Cf. Rosenberg v. Florida, No. 15-22113-CIV-Lenard/Goodman, 2015 WL 13653967, at
*7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 14, 2015).
155. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. Theoretically, state officials might be
liable under antitrust law for actions in their individual capacity, but apparently no such
claim has ever been seriously asserted. See Chi. Studio Rental Inc. v. Ill. Dep’t of Commerce
& Econ. Opportunity, No. 15 C 4099, 2016 WL 7213055, at *4, *6 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 29, 2016)
(finding that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar an antitrust claim against a state official
acting in her individual capacity but that the plaintiff did not adequately plead such a claim). 
156. 242 F.3d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir. 2001).
157. Id. at 208-09. 
158. Id. at 210-11.
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immunity clearly applied.159 Ex parte Young permitted the plaintiff’s
claim “to enjoin the Comptroller from committing violations of the
Sherman Act,”160 but the Eleventh Amendment foreclosed a claim
for damages, which the plaintiff (undoubtedly recognizing this
limitation) did not seek.161
Another area in which the Eleventh Amendment immunity is
broader than state action immunity concerns traditional state
agencies whose members have no financial interest in the entities
they regulate, such as a typical public utilities commission.162 This
kind of an agency is not immune from antitrust liability under
Parker unless its anticompetitive acts are authorized by a constitu-
tional branch of government;163 in other words, such an agency is
only subject to the clear articulation requirement. Because of the
Eleventh Amendment, however, the only available remedy in that
case is a prospective injunction entered against the officials them-
selves.164
159. Id. at 204-05.
160. Id. at 203. 
161. Id. at 203-05. The district court also dismissed the claim on Twenty-First Amendment
grounds, but the court of appeals vacated that as well. Id. at 202. The litigation dragged on
for years, eventually ending with the preemption of the state’s regulatory scheme by the
Sherman Act. TFWS, Inc. v. Franchot, 572 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 2009).
162. For example, the statute creating the Public Service Commission at issue in Cantor
v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), provided:
[N]o member of said commission shall be pecuniarily interested in any public
utility or public service subject to the jurisdiction and control of the commis-
sion.... No commission member shall be retained or employed by any public
utility or public service subject to the jurisdiction and control of the commission
during the time he is acting as such commissioner, and for [six] months
thereafter.
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 460.1 (2018). In 1939, the Public Utilities Commission was abolished and
its functions transferred to the Public Service Commission, see id. § 460.4, but the relevant
membership qualifications remained the same. History of the MPSC, MICH. DEP’T OF LI-
CENSING & REG. AFF., https://www.michigan.gov/MPSC/0,4639,7-159--40512--,00.html [https://
perma.cc/6Z5L-ZW8M].
163. See, e.g., Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46-47, 46 n.10 (1985)
(observing, without deciding, that state agencies likely satisfy the clear-state-policy but not
the active-supervision requirement to receive state action immunity); Goldfarb v. Va. State
Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 789-92 (1975) (holding that, although the state bar was a state agency, it
did not have state action immunity because its conduct was not authorized by a state statute
or supreme court rule).
164. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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State action immunity for state agencies and their officials is also
significantly limited by North Carolina State Board, which recog-
nizes immunity for state boards controlled by active market par-
ticipants only if they act pursuant to a clear state policy and are
actively supervised by a superior state body.165 In such a case, the
Supreme Court has concluded that members of such state boards
are not sufficiently independent of the profession they regulate to
warrant state action immunity, unless they satisfy both prongs of
Midcal.166 Eleventh Amendment immunity, by contrast, does not
distinguish between boards that are dominated by private practitio-
ners and those that are not.167 Regardless of its composition, the
agency is immune, as long as it is an arm of the state, even if
Midcal’s conditions for state action immunity are not met.168 As
emphasized above, Ex parte Young permits actions for prospective
relief against the agency officials in these cases.169
Under the state action doctrine, then, certain agencies and of-
ficials may be liable under the Sherman Act for both damages and
equitable remedies. If the agencies are arms of the state, however,
the Eleventh Amendment forecloses private damages and injunctive
relief against the agencies themselves, as well as private damages
against the agency officials acting in their official capacity.170 For
example, in Rodgers, the plaintiff alleged that a state licensing
board was not immune from antitrust liability under North Carolina
State Board because it was composed of active practitioners, but
165. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1110-13 (2015)
(“Midcal’s active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parker immunity for any
nonsovereign entity—public or private—controlled by active market participants.”).
166. Id. at 1110, 1117.
167. See Jemsek v. N.C. Med. Bd., No. 5:16-CV-59-D, 2017 WL 696721, at *5-6 (E.D.N.C.
Feb. 21, 2017) (“The Eleventh Amendment bars Jemsek’s claims against the NCMB,”
independent of North Carolina State Board).
168. See, e.g., Rodgers v. La. Bd. of Nursing, 665 F. App’x 326, 329-30 (5th Cir. 2016) (per
curiam) (holding the Eleventh Amendment immunized the State Board of Nursing, regardless
of whether N.C. Dental’s test for state action immunity was met); Jemsek, 2017 WL 696721,
at *5-6.
169. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
170. See supra Part I.B. In North Carolina State Board, the Supreme Court hinted at this
result. N.C. State Board, 135 S. Ct. at 1115. The Court wrote that the case before it did “not
offer occasion to address the question whether agency officials, including board members,
may, under some circumstances, enjoy immunity from damages liability,” and cited a footnote
in Goldfarb that referred to the possibility of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Id. (citing
Goldfarb v. Va. State Bd., 421 U.S. 773, 792 n.22 (1975)).
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the court held that it was immune from damages under the Elev-
enth Amendment.171 The plaintiff inexplicably named only the
board itself as the defendant, and chose not to seek any type of re-
lief against the members of the board,172 even though she presum-
ably could have sought injunctive relief under Ex parte Young.173
This category is the most interesting and problematic one from an
antitrust standpoint: cases challenging anticompetitive actions of
agencies that are agents of the state but do not meet the require-
ments of the state action doctrine. We consider the potential anti-
trust policy concerns this disjunction raises in this Article’s final
Part.
III. SOVEREIGN AND OFFICIAL ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES BEYOND
PARKER
At the end of the last Part, we explained that, in a significant
range of antitrust cases, the Eleventh Amendment immunizes state
agencies and officials for anticompetitive actions, even where state
action immunity would not apply—that is, where antitrust law and
its remedies would apply under the antitrust-specific standards of
state action immunity. In these cases, Ex parte Young permits ac-
tions solely for prospective relief against state officials acting in
their official capacities to prevent violations of valid federal law.174
This curious exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, as we
saw earlier, is thought necessary to prevent unconstitutional en-
forcement of state laws that are inconsistent with federal laws,
171. See Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 330. The court specifically rejected the plaintiff’s ar-
gument that the North Carolina State Board standard should be extended to Eleventh
Amendment immunity. See id. The board was composed of eleven members appointed by the
governor: eight registered nurses, one certified registered nurse anesthetist, and two non-
nurse consumer representatives. See LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:914(B)(1) (2018). But see Rodgers
v. La. Bd. of Nursing, No. 15-2176, 2015 WL 5307806, at *1 (W.D. La. Sept. 10, 2015)
(describing the board’s composition as “[eight] registered nurses, [one] certified registered
nurse anesthetist, and [two] ex officio non-voting physician advisors”), aff’d, 665 F. App’x 326
(5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam). The nine nurses must be “actively engaged in the practice of
nursing as a registered nurse at the time of appointment.” LA. STAT. ANN. § 37:916(A)(1)(d)
(2018).
172. See Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 327.
173. Cf. TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198, 203 (4th Cir. 2001).
174. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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while still protecting (at least to some extent) the state fisc.175 As a
result, Eleventh Amendment immunity forecloses damage liability
but not prospective injunctive relief in many cases in which the
state action doctrine (and the unqualified language of Section 4 of
the Clayton Act) would apparently authorize damages.176
Interestingly, however, the Supreme Court suggested in City of
Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. that holding federal law
applicable to a city did “not necessarily require the conclusion that
remedies appropriate to redress violations by private corporations
would be equally appropriate for municipalities.”177 That reference
indicated at least some discomfort with the notion of governmental
damage liability. And, as we noted earlier, Congress allayed its
discomfort by passing the LGAA, which forecloses damage liability
for municipalities, other local governments (defined broadly), and
their officials.178 According to one court, the LGAA responded to a
175. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 748 (1999) (characterizing Young as an “essential
... part of our sovereign immunity doctrine”); Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (“[T]he
availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the
Supremacy Clause.”).
176. In Goldfarb, the only case directly raising the issue of whether a state agency not
immune under the state action doctrine could be held liable for damages, the Court expressed
no reluctance to impose liability. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975). The
plaintiffs brought a class action against a state bar and county bar for price fixing, seeking
both injunctive relief and damages. See id. at 778. The Court recognized that the state bar
was a state agency for some purposes but held it liable for “voluntarily join[ing] in what is
essentially a private anticompetitive activity.” See id. at 791-92. The Court intimated no view
on whether the state bar was protected under the Eleventh Amendment. See id. at 792 n.22.
The case was remanded, and the petition for rehearing was denied. Id. at 793; petition for
reh’g denied, 423 U.S. 866 (1975).
177. 435 U.S. 389, 401-02 (1978). But cf. id. at 440 n.30 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (doubting
that a court “could possibly disregard [the] clear statutory command” to award treble
damages); id. at 442-43 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (doubting that a city would have a
“conceivable defense to damages”). For other sources, see also Cmty. Commc’ns Co. v. City of
Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 56-57 n.20 (1982) (“[A]s in City of Lafayette, we do not confront the issue
of remedies appropriate against municipal officials.”); id. at 65 n.2 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(“It will take a considerable feat of judicial gymnastics to conclude that municipalities are not
subject to treble damages to compensate any person ‘injured in his business or property.’”
(quoting Clayton Act of 1914 § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012))).
178. Supra note 37-38 and accompanying text; see Ne. Jet Ctr., Ltd. v. Lehigh-Northampton
Airport Auth., 767 F. Supp. 672, 681 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (“Congress intended [in the LGAA] to
create an absolute immunity for the conduct of a municipal authority, at least as far as
monetary damages are concerned.”). The Act also protects private persons from liability
“based on any official action directed by” a local government or its official. 15 U.S.C. § 36(a)
(2012); see Campbell v. Othoff, No. 4:15-cv-00143, 2016 WL 1066287, at *1-2 (D.N.D. Feb. 17,
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perceived “immediate need to take a ‘remedies approach’ to saving
local governments and their taxpayers from the potential financial
ruin occasioned by large monetary awards under the Clayton Act,”179
even if the governments had violated the antitrust laws and were
ineligible for state action immunity.180
Congress apparently chose not to extend the LGAA’s protec-
tion to other state actors because it believed, incorrectly, that the
state action doctrine or the Eleventh Amendment fully protected
them from damage liability.181 Sovereign state actors, such as the
2016) (holding that a private firm operating a prison commissary was immune under the
LGAA because it was acting under the direction of a county official).
179. Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Par. of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (E.D. La. 1985)
(citation omitted). The court noted that the LGAA was enacted in response to Unity Ventures
v. County of Lake, No. 81 C 2745 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 1984), in which “a jury awarded the
plaintiff $9.5 million in damages in an antitrust action against the local governments and
their officials.” Id. at 1130 n.7. Interestingly, after the enactment of the LGAA, the Illinois
district court set that award aside on a post-trial motion because, among other reasons, the
municipality was acting pursuant to a clearly articulated state policy. Unity Ventures v.
County of Lake, 631 F. Supp. 181, 191 (N.D. Ill. 1986), aff’d, 841 F.2d 770 (7th Cir. 1988).
180. A local government entity, as well as its officials, have state action immunity if they
act pursuant to clear state authorization. See, e.g., Campbell, 2016 WL 1066287, at *2. To be
immune from damage liability under the LGAA, local government officials and employees
need only be “acting in [their] official capacity,” 15 U.S.C. § 35(a), a standard that is
intentionally more expansive than the “clear state authorization” requirement of Parker
immunity. See Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., P.A. v. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., Inc., 853
F.2d 1139, 1145 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[O]n its face, the phrase ‘acting in an official capacity’
includes those lawful actions, undertaken in the course of a defendant’s performance of his
duties, that reasonably can be construed to be within the scope of his duties and consistent
with the general responsibilities and objectives of his position.”); see also Wee Care Child Ctr.,
Inc. v. Lumpkin, 680 F.3d 841, 849 (6th Cir. 2012) (concluding that employees act within their
official capacity “when conducting duties that are ‘consistent with the general responsibilities
and objectives’ of their positions” (quoting Sandcrest Outpatient Servs., 853 F.2d at 1145)). But
see United Nat’l Maint., Inc. v. San Diego Convention Ctr. Corp., No. 07cv2172 AJB, 2012 WL
12845620, at *3 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 5, 2012) (“[T]he appropriate standard for determining
application of the LGAA is the same standard that is applied for the State Action Doctrine ...,
with the only difference being the source of authority is local government, not state gov-
ernment.”), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds, 766 F.3d 1002 (9th Cir. 2014).
181. The legislative history of the LGAA indicates that Congress did not extend protection
to “[s]tates or their agencies with [s]tate-wide jurisdiction” because “[s]uch entities receive
antitrust immunity directly from the ‘state action’ doctrine.” H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 19
(1984). The premise was curious because the Court had decided Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar
before Congress passed the statute, and the Court there had expressed no reluctance to
impose damage liability on a state agency. See 421 U.S. 773, 791-93 (1975). In that case, the
plaintiffs brought a class action against a state bar and county bar for price fixing, seeking
both injunctive relief and damages. Id. at 778. The Court recognized that the state bar was
a state agency. Id. at 789-90. The Court intimated no view on whether the state bar was
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legislature, supreme court, and perhaps high-level executive-branch
agencies, are indeed categorically protected by the state action
doctrine;182 but inferior state agencies are only protected condition-
ally.183 The Court has made clear since the passage of the LGAA
that certain state regulatory agencies acting without legislative
command or supervision have no Parker immunity184—they are
protected, if at all, by the Eleventh Amendment as qualified by Ex
parte Young.185 Thus, together, the Eleventh Amendment and the
LGAA shelter most state and local regulators from damage liabil-
ity,186 even where state action immunity would not apply.
protected under the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 792 n.22. The case was remanded, id. at 793,
and the Court denied the petition for rehearing, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
Goldfarb notwithstanding, Congress’s idea seems to be that local government entities,
which derive immunity from action of state sovereign actors, might be found to have no
immunity from antitrust remedies, including damages, whereas states and state agencies
with state-wide jurisdiction automatically have complete state action immunity. See H.R. REP.
NO. 98-965, at 19. Though Congress did not mention the Eleventh Amendment, see generally
H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, it had no reason to address it. The LGAA was provoked by Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982). See H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 3
(“Beginning early in the 98th Congress, a number of legislative initiatives were introduced
in the aftermath of the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in Community Communications.”).
That decision threatened the imposition of damage liability on cities, Cmty. Commc’ns, 455
U.S. at 65 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), and Congress surely knew that cities were not entitled
to protection from damage liability under the Eleventh Amendment, see Mt. Healthy City Sch.
Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280 (1977) (explaining that “counties and similar
municipal corporations” do not have Eleventh Amendment immunity).
182. A few months before Congress enacted the LGAA, the Supreme Court decided Hoover
v. Ronwin, holding that a state supreme court, like a legislature, is ipso facto immune from
the antitrust laws for anticompetitive actions. 466 U.S. 558, 567-68 (1984). Congress was
aware of the decision. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-965, at 7 n.6 (“The Court’s most recent decision
in the area, Hoover v. Ronwin, has done little to clarify the delegation of state immunity test.”
(internal citation omitted)).
183. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111-12 (2015)
(holding that, for immunity, state regulatory agencies controlled by active market participants
must be actively supervised by other state actors and act pursuant to clear state policy); Town
of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 46 & n.10 (1985) (holding that municipalities are
not subject to the active-supervision requirement, and observing without deciding that the
requirement would likely also not apply to state agencies); cf. S. Motor Carriers Rate
Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S. 48, 64-65 (1985) (holding that a state regulatory
agency can articulate a policy authorizing a restraint that satisfies the first prong of the
Midcal test in providing immunity to regulated private entities).
184. See N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1116-17.
185. See generally TFWS, Inc. v. Schaefer, 242 F.3d 198 (4th Cir. 2001).
186. The exception would be state regulatory agencies that do not act as arms of the state,
which are not protected under the Eleventh Amendment. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-
Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30, 52 (1994) (explaining that Port Authority did not have the
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A. Antitrust Injury and Eleventh Amendment Immunity
In this Section we consider whether the protection from antitrust
damage liability afforded some state actors by the Eleventh Amend-
ment (and, by implication, its twin, the LGAA) in antitrust cases
and to which they would be exposed to liability under the state ac-
tion doctrine is inefficient, and, if so, whether such a result is some-
how justified.
Any immunity may reduce efficiency. The state action doctrine
immunizes state agencies and officials from antitrust liability, in-
cluding damage liability, when their action is attributable to a
conscious state choice to promote some other value even at the ex-
pense of consumer welfare.187 This immunity necessarily means that
anticompetitive conduct of public entities and officials will not be
deterred by any penalty. Private actors have an economic incentive
to restrict competition and increase monopoly profit; the threat of an
antitrust sanction deters the anticompetitive conduct by reducing
the expected gain. Public actors may have similar incentives to re-
strict competition, but immunity reduces their expected cost. As we
explained earlier, the conditions of state action immunity are de-
signed to assure that the state takes political responsibility for any
such decision.188
State actors may have the greatest incentive to subvert the public
interest in instances in which state action immunity does not apply.
For example, in North Carolina State Board, state action immunity
did not apply because regulators who are active practitioners have
an incentive to act in the interests of the profession, not the public
interest; they are “more similar to private trade associations vested
by States with regulatory authority” than typical state agen-
cies.189 Similarly, in Goldfarb, the Court held that, by mandating
protection of the Eleventh Amendment because it was distinct from the state).
187. See supra Part I.A.
188. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
189. N.C. State Bd., 135 S. Ct. at 1114. The Court reasoned that “[s]tate agencies controlled
by active market participants, who possess singularly strong private interests, pose the very
risk of self-dealing [that the active] supervision requirement was created to address.” Id. It
added that its “conclusion does not question the good faith of state officers but rather is an
assessment of the structural risk of market participants’ confusing their own interests with
the State’s policy goals.” Id. 
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a minimum fee schedule, a state bar association, “voluntarily joined
in what is essentially a private anticompetitive activity,” and was
subject to antitrust liability.190 In these circumstances, denial of
state action immunity follows from a public choice analysis: the
regulators who are also active practitioners are captured by the
private interest and act essentially as its agents.191 For similar
reasons, the court of appeals in North Carolina State Board held
that the members of the board had the “capacity to conspire” and
had conspired to suppress a competing form of practice.192
State action immunity is also inapplicable where a state regula-
tory agency, even though not dominated by active practitioners, acts
anticompetitively without clear state authorization.193 In such a
case, the agency’s action does not involve the private interest of the
agency’s officials in the same sense as in the case of boards con-
trolled by active practitioners.194 Even in these circumstances, how-
ever, government regulators may act in the interest of regulated
firms for their personal benefit, for instance to maximize their
future employment potential.195
In the foregoing cases, the state action immunity does not apply
because the state has not made the clear choice to displace competi-
tion with some form of anticompetitive regulation, or at least has
not made sufficient provision to assure that its conscious choices
have been carried out.196 In other words, there is too much private
190. Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 791-92 (1975).
191. See John Shepard Wiley Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 714 (1986).
192. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 717 F.3d 359, 371-73 (4th Cir. 2013), aff’d,
135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015); see also Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15CV831,
2017 WL 401234, at *12-13 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017) (holding that physical therapists and
their clients sufficiently alleged an agreement among members of the acupuncture board and
the board itself to violate the antitrust laws by preventing physical therapists from
performing a procedure common to both professions). But see Robb v. Conn. Bd. of Veterinary
Med., 157 F. Supp. 3d 130, 146-47 (D. Conn. 2016) (holding that a veterinarian failed to allege
sufficiently that the defendants formed an agreement because he did not allege “any conduct
of the individual Board members other than sitting in adjudication of an administrative
proceeding brought by another state agency, an action the Board members are required to take
under state law”).
193. See FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 225-27 (2013).
194. See id. at 226.
195. See Wiley Jr., supra note 191, at 732 n.92.
196. See, e.g., Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105-
06 (1980).
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(or nonsovereign public) choice in the regulatory arrangement to
justify immunity under the antitrust-specific standards of the state
action doctrine. In some of those instances, Eleventh Amendment
immunity will not apply either, so state actors may be exposed to
antitrust liability.
Nevertheless, in some of the cases in which state action immunity
does not apply, the Eleventh Amendment provides immunity197 at
least from private damages,198 and, because of Seminole Tribe,
Congress cannot remove that immunity through legislation enacted
under the Commerce Clause.199 If, for example, fashion designers
form a private association with retailers to deny distribution
channels to firms that copy their designs, they violate the antitrust
laws and may be subject to private damage liability.200 But if a state
dental board controlled by practicing dentists issues an order
prohibiting nondentists from whitening teeth, they are immune
from damages.201 Or, if a state university hospital and a private
university hospital agree not to poach one another’s faculty, the
private hospital’s administrators are potentially subject to damage
liability, but the state hospital’s administrators in their official
197. See supra Part II.D.
198. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
199. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
200. Cf. Fashion Originators’ Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 461-64 (1941) (holding
that an agreement among dress makers to refuse to deal with retailers who deal with style
pirates violates the FTC Act).
201. Cf. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1108, 1115 (2015)
(explaining that this case did not offer an opportunity to decide the question of immunity from
damages, but that states can extend Parker immunity to state agencies by establishing clear
policies and providing active supervision). Similarly, if a state cosmetology board controlled
by professional cosmetologists prohibited unlicensed hair stylists to blow-dry someone else’s
hair for money, the board members would be immune from damages. See Eric Boehm, Inside
the Insane Battle Over Arizona’s Blow-Dry Licensing Bill, REASON (Feb. 2, 2018, 10:47 AM),
http://reason.com/blog/2018/02/02/inside-the-insane-battle-over-arizonas-d [https://perma.cc/
SE45-7HFG].
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capacities are presumably not.202 What are the efficiency conse-
quences of such a disparity in treatment?
In the remainder of this Section, we consider this question on the
assumption that, if state action immunity does not apply, the action
of agencies and officials are essentially private and therefore would
be subject to the antitrust remedies as private actors. We apply the
accepted standards for efficient antitrust damages to see what is
lost, under these assumptions, by providing Eleventh Amendment
immunity. In the next Section, we consider whether the special
institutional circumstances of nonimmune public actors justify dif-
ferent treatment on remedial grounds.
The optimal sanction for an economic offense is the social harm
caused by the offense, adjusted for the probability of imposition.203
For antitrust offenses, the social harm is the “net harm to persons
other than the offender” caused by the practice.204 The concept of an
optimal penalty implies that a penalty can be excessive or inade-
quate.205 It might be excessive because antitrust rules and costly
processes are imperfect and may result in liability for harmless or
even procompetitive conduct. An excessive penalty can also induce
an actor to over-invest in measures to avoid liability. When a pro-
spective antitrust violator faces a sanction equal to the social cost
of the conduct, appropriately adjusted for the probability of en-
forcement, the person will engage in it only when it returns greater
benefits than the social cost it imposes.206 Efficiency increases when
that socially beneficial conduct is not deterred.207 The essence of the
202. Cf. Seaman v. Duke Univ., No. 1:15-CV-462, 2018 WL 718961, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Jan.
4, 2018) (approving settlement against University of North Carolina defendants, and noting
that plaintiff “would be limited to recovering only injunctive relief from [an individual
defendant] in his official capacity, as official capacity suits against State agents are limited
to injunctive relief”); Emery P. Dalesio, Lawsuit: Duke, UNC Agreed to Not Hire Each Other’s
Doctors, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 2, 2018), http://www.apnews.com/675793130b184364a9d0d
8e7764c05cc/Lawsuit:-Duke,-UNC-agreed-to-not-hire-each-other’s-doctors [http://perma.cc/
B5VA-CEHK].
203. William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 652,
656-57 (1983).
204. Id. at 656.
205. See id. at 658.
206. See id. at 678.
207. See id. at 655.
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optimal sanction, therefore, is that it forces an antitrust violator to
internalize the costs of its anticompetitive conduct.208
The antitrust injury and standing doctrines are designed to result
in damage awards that approximate the optimal penalty.209 The
antitrust injury doctrine limits recovery to harms caused by the
anticompetitive aspect of the alleged violation210—for example, the
overcharge in price-fixing cases and lost profits of the victim of an
inefficient exclusionary practice.211 Antitrust standing doctrine fur-
ther limits the right to recover to relatively efficient plaintiffs
among those who have suffered antitrust injury.212 Section 4 of the
Clayton Act, on its face, allows “any person” injured by an antitrust
violation to recover treble damages from anyone responsible for the
injury.213 But many antitrust violations are large-scale economic
activities that harm numerous actors in different ways unrelated to
208. See id. at 678; Wiley Jr., supra note 191, at 774 n.287.
209. An antitrust violation may incur criminal penalties as well as civil damages. See 15
U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (specifying that a contract in restraint of trade is a felony and specifying
criminal sanctions); id. § 2 (specifying similar attributes of monopolization). When prospective
violators face expected criminal sanctions as well as damage liability, the optimal penalty will
approximate the combination of the two. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 47 (2d ed.
2001) (“Criminal and civil remedies for antitrust violations are usually considered and eval-
uated separately, but this is a mistake.”). The analysis in the text assumes that criminal
sanctions will not be imposed. 
210. See Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 334 (1990) (“[I]njury,
although causally related to an antitrust violation, nevertheless will not qualify as ‘antitrust
injury’ unless it is attributable to an anticompetitive aspect of the practice under scrutiny.”
(citation omitted)); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)
(holding that a private antitrust plaintiff seeking damages “must prove antitrust injury, which
is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from
that which makes defendants’ acts unlawful”).
211. See, e.g., Henry v. N.C. Acupuncture Licensing Bd., No. 1:15CV831, 2017 WL 401234,
at *11-12 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 30, 2017).
212. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Cal. State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S.
519, 542 (1983) (recognizing that the existence of direct victims of an antitrust violation may
prevent more remote victims from having antitrust standing); Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp.,
823 F.3d 759, 772 (2d Cir. 2016) (recognizing that to have antitrust standing plaintiffs must
be “efficient enforcers of the antitrust laws”). See generally John E. Lopatka & William H.
Page, Who Suffered Antitrust Injury in the Microsoft Case?, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 829, 831
(2001) (“Antitrust law has set limits on the scope of liability because actions that violate
antitrust law may have both efficient and inefficient consequences, and those consequences
may be felt, directly or indirectly, by a multitude of economic actors.”).
213. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (“[A]ny person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost
of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.”).
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consumer welfare.214 If every remote or tangential harm associated
with antitrust violations were compensable by treble damages, the
remedy would raise a substantial risk of overdeterrence.215 To-
gether, antitrust injury and standing doctrines aim to minimize the
costs of overinclusion and underinclusion otherwise associated with
rules of antitrust liability, and to assure optimal deterrence.216
If the Supreme Court’s limits on Parker immunity establish the
appropriate scope of antitrust laws, then the Eleventh Amendment
is inefficient to the extent that it forecloses a damage remedy that
would otherwise deter an actor from implementing an anticompeti-
tive state regulation that reduces economic welfare. In North
Carolina State Board, for example, the Court denied state action
immunity to a state licensing board controlled by active practitio-
ners because it was not actively supervised by an independent state
body.217 If we consider the case from a strictly interest group
perspective, the risk of anticompetitive effects is clear.218 As an
amicus brief signed by forty-five public choice scholars put it,
When an economic interest group is given free rein to enact
regulations that exclude potential competitors from the market-
place, should we expect that group to use its power in the service
of legitimate governmental interests, or should we instead
expect that group to promote its own private interests and those
of its friends? One does not need a Ph.D. in economics—or even
a particularly keen insight into human nature—to guess the
answer to this question.219
214. See Lopatka & Page, supra note 212, at 831.
215. See Gelboim, 823 F.3d at 772; cf. Wiley Jr., supra note 191, at 774 n.286.
216. See generally William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN.
L. REV. 1445, 1483-85 (1985).
217. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
218. See Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political
Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 375, 394-95 (1983); see also William H. Page, Interest Groups,
Antitrust, and State Regulation: Parker v. Brown in the Economic Theory of Legislation, 1987
DUKE L.J. 618, 629, 636 (“An interest group that is seeking state protection from competition
will necessarily prefer a clear legislative preference to a simple delegation of the issue to an
administrative agency. The clear preference is more valuable because it is more certain to pro-
duce the desired anticompetitive consequences.”).
219. Brief of Scholars of Public Choice Economics as Amici Curiae in Support of Re-
spondent at 6-7, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (No. 13-534).
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If, as this reasoning predicts, the board’s members agreed, in
service of their private professional interests, to use the board’s
powers to exclude a disfavored form of practice, the board acted
essentially as a private entity. As private actors, the board and its
members would normally be liable for the social costs they im-
pose.220 The excluded competitors would presumably have antitrust
standing, and their lost profits would be antitrust injury and there-
fore compensable in treble damages in a suit against those respon-
sible.221 Moreover, state enforcement of the exclusionary action (not
available, obviously, to private offenders) could arguably make the
harm even more certain, severe, and durable. The absence of a
damage remedy might have left an antitrust violation by the board
undeterred.
Optimal deterrence not only requires that the sanction imposed
be optimal but also that an enforcer seek to impose it.222 The pros-
pect of damages encourages victims to seek relief. Most antitrust
suits are motivated by the prospect of a damage recovery augmented
by a proportional attorney’s fee.223 Indeed, the prospect of a damage
recovery may be necessary to motivate the filing of meritorious
claims, even if it also motivates strike suits. Large-scale class ac-
tions alleging concealable offenses, such as price fixing, can take
years to litigate,224 and they carry a substantial risk of a defense vic-
tory.225 An action that survives a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim because it alleges a plausible price-fixing conspiracy
often fails at the summary judgment stage after lengthy and expen-
sive discovery fails to turn up evidence that the defendants con-
spired within the meaning of Section 1.226 Only the possibility of a
220. See supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
221. See 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012).
222. See Landes, supra note 203, at 657.
223. See Daniel A. Crane, Optimizing Private Antitrust Enforcement, 63 VAND. L. REV. 675,
675-76 (2010). See generally 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (providing for treble damages and the recovery
of an attorney’s fee).
224. Cf. Crane, supra note 223, at 692 (focusing on a study involving “private antitrust
litigation”).
225. Cf. Jeffrey M. Perloff et al., Antitrust Settlements and Trial Outcomes, 78 REV. ECON.
& STAT. 401, 403-04 (1996) (finding that plaintiffs won approximately 31 percent of private
antitrust suits that went to trial).
226. See, for example, In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litig., 782 F.3d 867, 869-70, 879 (7th
Cir. 2015), in which the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment more than four years
after it had affirmed (on interlocutory review) the denial of a motion to dismiss. In re Text
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damage award would justify bringing an action when the plaintiff
faced such a risk.
By foreclosing any damage remedy against the state or its of-
ficials for antitrust violations,227 the Eleventh Amendment increases
the probability that some meritorious private antitrust suits are
never brought and hence some inefficient antitrust violations are
not deterred. It removes a significant incentive for regulators to
take antitrust concerns into account. Actions that inflict substantial
competitive harm, but are then discontinued, cannot support any
kind of relief in antitrust suits against either the state agency or its
officials.228 For example, one state medical board adopted rules
limiting competition from telemedicine providers.229 In doing so, the
board was evidently not deterred by the prospect of damage liability
or an equitable order. The state legislature overrode the rules,230
making prospective relief irrelevant, but no antitrust remedy was
available to competing medical providers for past harms. The costs
of anticompetitive regulations such as these may be substantial. A
recent study concluded that 85 percent of the 1790 state licensing
boards in the United States are composed predominantly of prac-
ticing members of their professions and face little supervision.231 If
a large share of these boards lack state action immunity under N.C.
Dental,232 then the risk of anticompetitive conduct that raises prices
and excludes rivals in ways that may not immediately provoke an
injunction action seems substantial. Eleventh Amendment immu-
nity all but assures that no damage remedy is available.
Messaging Antitrust Litig., 630 F.3d 622, 627, 629 (7th Cir. 2010).
227. See supra note 170 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
229. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Federal Trade Commission Closes
Investigation of Texas Medical Board After Texas Passes Law Expanding Telemedicine and
Telehealth Services (June 21, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2017/06/
federal-trade-commission-closes-investigation-texas-medical-board [https://perma.cc/VRC8-
UW7R].
230. See id.
231. See Allensworth, supra note 43, at 1572, 1609.
232. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1117 (2015).
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B. Are There Benefits of Sovereign and Official Antitrust
Immunities Beyond the Parker Doctrine?
So far, we have assumed that state action immunity strikes the
optimal balance between the demands of antitrust law and state
sovereignty, and that state-connected officials who are not immune
are in the same position as private actors, subject to all antitrust
remedies. But Eleventh Amendment immunity shelters agencies
and officials where, under the Parker doctrine, they would remain
exposed to damage liability.233 In the last Section, we analyzed the
consequences of this incongruity under the usual standards of an-
titrust injury and standing. We concluded that Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity from damage liability may tend to impede optimal
deterrence of anticompetitive state regulation.
The analysis of optimal deterrence in the previous Section as-
sumed that state officials respond to the prospect of liability in the
same way as private actors.234 But the issue is more complicated
than it seems. If we extend the optimal deterrence analysis beyond
the assumptions of antitrust injury and standing to take account of
the institutional position of state officials, the picture changes. Even
if the officials are acting without clearly articulated authority, or
without necessary supervision, imposing antitrust damage liability
may overdeter regulation.
Regulators, even those in agencies without Parker immunity,
must make a different calculation than purely private actors. A
private actor held liable for antitrust damages, properly defined,
internalizes the costs and benefits of committing the offense; it
commits the violation when its private benefits exceed its costs.235
But if a government actor imposes an anticompetitive restraint
through the power of the government, the actor and her agency
capture at best only a small fraction of the monopoly profits that the
restraint causes. Even an active practitioner that participates in
imposing a restraint that excludes competing practitioners receives
only a small share of the benefits to her profession, yet the damages
calculated in accordance with the theory of the optimal penalty
233. See supra notes 154-55 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part III.A.
235. Cf. supra notes 203-08 and accompanying text.
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would far exceed the actor’s private gain. And the regulator may act
in many different markets, increasing its exposure. Moreover, an
agency official who is not an active practitioner receives only an
indirect economic benefit from anticompetitive regulation. One could
argue, then, that the general threat of damage liability for anti-
competitive regulation creates a disincentive to regulate at all, even
for the public benefit. As the Court in North Carolina State Board
recognized, private practitioners may not agree to serve as regula-
tors, unless the system makes accommodations.236
True, private corporate conspirators can also face a risk of
damage liability out of proportion to their potential gain from the
offense.237 If the plaintiff chooses to sue a group of rivals and settles
early with some of them for relatively small amounts, the last firm
to settle will be liable for the full amount of the harm minus the
settlement amounts, regardless of the relatively small benefit that
the defendant received from the violation because of the doctrine of
joint and several liability, the principle of claim reduction, and the
absence of a right to contribution among the conspirators.238
Defendants are encouraged to race to settle. But, in this instance,
each defendant also has a chance of paying less than his or her
proportionate liability.239 Ex ante—when the offense is occur-
ring—each defendant faces an expected liability commensurate with
his or her gain. This is not the case when a government regulator
can be held liable for the full extent of the damage caused by
anticompetitive regulation.
The benchmark rates cases present a closer analogy to the
regulator. If banks conspire to fix a benchmark rate that benefits
them in the sale of financial securities but also injures a vast
236. See 135 S. Ct. at 1115.
237. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 251-54
(2007).
238. See id. (concluding that the current rules are “fundamentally unfair” and
recommending legislation that would allow reduction of a claim by the settling defendant’s
proportionate share of liability); see also Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S.
630, 646 (1981) (recognizing joint and several liability in antitrust cases with no right of
contribution); In re Foreign Exch. Benchmark Rates Antitrust Litig., No. 13 Civ. 7789 (LGS),
2016 WL 5108131, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 20, 2016) (rejecting the argument of nonsettling
defendants “that the antitrust laws’ imposition of treble damages and the provision for joint
and several liability are themselves ‘disproportionate’”).
239. Contra ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 237, at 251-52.
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number of traders in other markets, total losses can dwarf the
conspirators’ gain.240 Imposing liability for all losses in such a case
might result in overdeterrence,241 but excessive private precaution
does not represent the magnitude of social cost that unduly timid
regulation does.
In other contexts in which state actors are subject to damage li-
ability, the law has also hedged or limited the imposition of liability
to avoid the danger of overdeterrence. In the case of governmental
takings, the Constitution itself creates a remedy for just compensa-
tion.242 But the Takings Clause “is designed not to limit the gov-
ernmental interference with property rights per se, but rather to
secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper interference
amounting to a taking.”243 State actors may also be liable for
damages pursuant to § 1983 for infringement of federal constitu-
tional or statutory rights.244 But the law tightly circumscribes
governmental liability,245 and even where it is imposed, state law
routinely indemnifies private actors.246 With these limitations, the
deterrent effect of governmental damage liability in these contexts
has been contested.247
Similar concerns about exposing those acting on behalf of
governmental entities to damage liability are evident in the
240. Cf. Gelboim v. Bank of Am. Corp., 823 F.3d 759, 779 (2d Cir. 2016) (noting that “if the
Banks control only a small percentage of the ultimate identified market” affected by London
Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) collusion, this case may raise a “concern of damages
disproportionate to wrongdoing”). See generally Andrew J. Fuller, Comment, Let the State
Decide: The Efficient Antitrust Enforcer and the Avoidance of Anticompetitive Remedies, 10
J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 203 (2017) (arguing that antitrust standing should be denied
where damage liability would bankrupt defendants and result in less competitive market
structures).
241. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 237, at 246-47.
242. U.S. CONST. amend V; see First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 315-16 (1987) (“[T]he compensation remedy is required by the
Constitution [for a governmental taking].”).
243. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale, 482 U.S. at 315.
244. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
245. For actions in the official capacity of the defendant, the action must be pursuant to a
policy or practice of the agency. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691-94 (1978). For
actions in the individual capacity of the defendant, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant’s actions violate a clearly established right. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982).
246. See, e.g., Williams v. Horvath, 548 P.2d 1125, 1131, 1134 (Cal. 1976).
247. See, e.g., Jon O. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen the Section
1983 Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers’ Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J. 447 (1978).
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legislative history of the LGAA.248 The Supreme Court’s decisions in
Boulder and Lafayette triggered numerous damages actions against
local governments,249 which, in turn, prompted the governments to
lobby Congress for the shelter of statutory immunity.250 Congress
was persuaded that the availability of damages liability for local
governments’ antitrust violations would do more harm than good:
The Senate Judiciary Committee studied the effects of Lafayette
and Boulder on the operation of local governments over a two
year period. It found that “[m]ore than one hundred Federal
antitrust suits seeking treble damages [were presently] pending
against cities, counties, townships and virtually every other type
of local government.” After considering the testimony of several
antitrust scholars [including Phillip Areeda], the Committee
concluded that “in many instances, the practical impact of
Boulder and Lafayette has been to paralyze the decisionmaking
functions of local government. The threat of antitrust treble
damage actions has caused local officials to avoid decisions that
may touch on the antitrust laws even when such decisions have
involved critical public services.” The Committee also concluded
that “regardless of whether a local government has violated the
antitrust laws, it is inappropriate to assess damages which ul-
timately must be borne by taxpayers.”251
Congress was concerned that the threat of liability would chill
individuals from acting decisively in areas that might implicate
antitrust.252 A similar concern induced Congress to enact protection
for health care peer review activities in the Health Care Quality
Improvement Act of 1986 (HCQIA).253 Congress was concerned that
“the threat of private money damage liability under Federal laws,
including treble damage liability under Federal antitrust law,
248. See, e.g., Local Government Antitrust Liability: The Boulder Decision: Hearings Before
the Committee on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. (1982) (statement of Tom Moody, Mayor of
Columbus, Ohio).
249. See Jefferson Disposal Co. v. Par. of Jefferson, 603 F. Supp. 1125, 1130 (E.D. La.
1985).
250. See David R. Spiegel, Local Governments and the Terror of Antitrust, 69 A.B.A. J. 163,
163 (1983).
251. Jefferson Disposal Co., 603 F. Supp. at 1130 (citations omitted).
252. See id.
253. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3794 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101-11152 (2012)).
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unreasonably discourages physicians from participating in effective
professional peer review.”254 The Act confers immunity from
antitrust treble damage liability on a professional review body and
individuals constituting or working with the body when they act
reasonably in taking professional review actions.255 Absent immu-
nity, a hospital peer review committee and its members were at risk
of antitrust challenge by physicians they disciplined, such as by
withdrawing hospital privileges; even when peer review is autho-
rized by state law, state action immunity might be unavailable for
failure to satisfy the two-prong Midcal test.256 Notably, both the
LGAA and the HCQIA insulate both the relevant entity and its
officials and employees from damage liability.257 In other areas, such
as § 1983, the law has drawn a distinction between the liability of
the entity and the liability of officials and employees.258
C. Accidental Efficiency
The current incongruity of state action and Eleventh Amendment
immunities is an accident of the application of two frameworks of
sovereign immunity to similar settings. It was not a considered (or
explained) choice to leave some agencies subject only to Eleventh
Amendment immunity in antitrust cases, and to permit injunctive
relief in those cases only against agency officials.259 This Section,
however, offers a rationale for the present state of affairs.
One way of thinking about this issue is to ask whether it would
make sense to harmonize the two immunities in cases in which,
under present law, Eleventh Amendment immunity applies but
Parker immunity does not. One path to harmony would be to extend
254. 42 U.S.C. § 11101(4) (2012).
255. See id. § 11111(a)(1).
256. See, e.g., Patrick v. Burget, 486 U.S. 94, 100, 105-06, 105 n.8 (1988) (holding in a case
decided after enactment of the HCQIA, but to which the Act did not apply, that hospital peer
review activities did not have state action immunity because they lacked active supervision).
257. 15 U.S.C. § 35(a) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 11111(a)(1).
258. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 637-38, 657 (1980) (holding that even
though municipal officials have immunity from damage liability for actions that violate
§ 1983, municipalities have none).
259. See Susan Beth Farmer, Altering the Balance Between State Sovereignty and
Competition: The Impact of Seminole Tribe on the Antitrust State Action Immunity Doctrine,
23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1403, 1416-17, 1423-28 (1997).
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state action immunity to the cases in which Eleventh Amendment
immunity applies—in other words to expand category A to include
the cases in category D in our earlier diagram. But that choice
would probably not be optimal. State action immunity shields all
agencies and officials from all types of relief, prospective and
retrospective, and from claims by public and private plaintiffs.260 If
the Court was correct to deny state action immunity to agencies that
restricted competition without a clearly articulated state policy or
without adequate supervision, it would be costly to immunize fully
those agencies and officials from all liability. Eleventh Amendment
immunity limits those costs by permitting public or private claims
for injunctive relief.261 These differences reduce any costs of un-
derdeterring anticompetitive regulation. The antitrust remedial
gaps created by the Eleventh Amendment seem modest and gen-
erally justified.
That leaves the possibility of restricting Eleventh Amendment
immunity to the cases in which state action immunity applies,
making the affected state agencies and officials subject to treble
damage liability—in other words, simply eliminating category D in
our earlier diagram. Of course, under Seminole Tribe, Congress
cannot abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity using its Com-
merce Clause power.262 But that limitation on congressional power
seems purely academic in this instance—given its enactment of the
LGAA in the parallel instance of municipal liability,263 and its
continuing solicitude for state autonomy, Congress would certainly
not take that path.
Nor would such a course be justified, even if it were conceivable.
As we showed in the last part, exposing state officials to damage
liability would involve costs of both underdeterrence and overdeter-
rence. Which costs predominate is an empirical question, but it
seems probable that the costs of underdeterrence are small, because
of the Eleventh Amendment doctrine’s own limitations on the scope
of its immunity.264 First, in some instances, a plaintiff might recover
260. See supra Part I.A.
261. See supra Part I.B.
262. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 248-52 and accompanying text.
264. See supra Part I.B.
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damages from firms who acted pursuant to nonimmune state
regulatory authorization.265 In such a case, damage liability is
imposed on some of the actors responsible for an antitrust violation.
Under the doctrine of joint and several liability, the private actors
would be liable for all of the harm caused by the overcharge or
exclusionary contracts,266 even though state actors partially
responsible for the harm escape liability.267 And in this instance, the
private actors would be the primary beneficiaries of the regulation.
Second, even if damages are not available from private actors, the
injunctive remedy may provide sufficient incentives to sue for many
offenses and mitigate, if not eliminate, the potential harm they
cause. The Eleventh Amendment itself does not preclude the federal
government from obtaining any remedy, including damages.268 But
the antitrust laws themselves largely confine the FTC and DOJ to
equitable relief.269 This authority is likely to be adequate in many
cases. Most state-created restraints are not concealed—if an agency
excludes a firm from the market or facilitates price fixing, everyone
is likely to know about it. State agencies are subject to sunshine
265. See Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 592-98 (1976) (suggesting that a
regulated utility could be held liable for antitrust damages for conduct taken pursuant to
authorization by a state regulatory agency); see also Lopatka, supra note 27, at 968-70
(examining the Cantor decision). The Court in Cantor reviewed its case law and concluded
that in
each of these cases the initiation and enforcement of the program under attack
involved a mixture of private and public decisionmaking. In each case,
notwithstanding the state participation in the decision, the private party
exercised sufficient freedom of choice to enable the Court to conclude that he
should be held responsible for the consequences of his decision.
Cantor, 428 U.S. at 593. But cf. FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 647 (1992)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Liability under the antitrust laws should not turn on how en-
thusiastically a state official carried out his or her statutory duties. The regulated entity has
no control over the regulator, and very likely will have no idea as to the degree of scrutiny
that its filings may receive. Thus, a party could engage in exactly the same conduct in two
States, each of which had exactly the same policy of allowing anticompetitive behavior and
exactly the same regulatory structure, and discover afterward that its actions in one State
were immune from antitrust prosecution, but that its actions in the other resulted in treble-
damages liability.”).
266. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 237, at 251.
267. See supra Part I.B (explaining that Eleventh Amendment immunity shields state
actors from damages liability).
268. William Van Alstyne, When Can a State Be Sued?, 66 POPULAR GOV’T 44, 44 (2001).
269. See John E. Lopatka & James F. Mongoven, After Preliminary Relief in Merger Cases
is Denied, What Then?, in 17 RESEARCH L. LAW AND ECONOMICS, 149, 154-56, 160-65 (Richard
O. Zerbe, Jr. & William Kovacic eds.,1995).
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laws,270 and their actions are often covered by the press.271 At the
very least, disadvantaged entities will know they have been harmed
and will have reason to voice their displeasure. State-enforced
restraints may actually be more likely than purely private re-
straints to attract the attention of the federal antitrust enforcers, as
they did in North Carolina State Board and subsequent investiga-
tions.272
Public agencies may be more aggressive enforcers than private
plaintiffs in seeking injunctive relief. Unlike private parties, public
agencies do not maximize profits. For public agencies, the expected
cost of a failed injunction action does not enter into a profit calculus,
though of course it entails an opportunity cost in light of a budget
constraint.273 Although federal antitrust agencies face various
institutional, political, and bureaucratic pressures, they act (at least
in theory) to promote the public interest.274 As a result, the agencies
may pursue cases for equitable relief that private parties would not
pursue.275 They have no power to impose a civil or administrative
fine, so they cannot penalize past anticompetitive conduct, except in
circumstances unlikely to be present in actions involving anti-
competitive regulation.276 Nevertheless, an injunction can prevent
270. All states and the federal government have “sunshine laws,” which require
governmental agencies to open certain meetings and records to the public. See THE
REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, THE FIRST AMENDMENT HANDBOOK 69-70
(Gregg P. Leslie ed., 7th ed. 2011).
271. See, e.g., Patrick McGeehan, On the Waterfront, a Mob Watchdog Is Fighting to
Survive, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/17/nyregion/water
front-commission-new-york-new-jersey-mob.html [https://perma.cc/5BYV-PMZH] (discussing
actions of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor). 
272. See N.C. State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1107-08 (2015); see also
FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., Inc., 568 U.S. 216, 220-22 (2013); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins.,
504 U.S. 621, 625 (1992); S. Motor Carriers Rate Conference, Inc. v. United States, 471 U.S.
48, 50-51 (1985).
273. See Lopatka & Mongoven, supra note 269, at 180.
274. Cf. id. at 167-78 (discussing alternative hypotheses to explain enforcement decisions
of antitrust agencies).
275. See id.
276. The United States may recover damages for injuries to its business or property. See
Clayton Act of 1914 § 4A, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2012). Both the FTC and the DOJ claim the right
to obtain the disgorgement of profits as an equitable remedy. See, e.g., United States v.
Morgan Stanley, 881 F. Supp. 2d 563, 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (approving consent decree
requiring disgorgement by financial services firm to resolve complaint by United States
alleging violation of Sherman Act Section 1); United States v. Keyspan Corp., 763 F. Supp.
2d 633, 638-40 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (holding that the United States has authority to obtain
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a continuing violation and thus limit the long-term anticompetitive
consequences of a state regulator’s action.
Apart from actions by the federal antitrust enforcement agencies
for equitable relief, private injunction actions under Ex parte Young
can limit the harm from anticompetitive state agency conduct.277 In
some cases, only future harm is at stake. Even if harm has occurred,
prospective relief may provide a sufficient reason to sue, particu-
larly since the Clayton Act authorizes courts to award successful
plaintiffs the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee.278 The
prospect of an injunction may not deter anticompetitive regulation,
but the injunction can at least end harmful conduct when it occurs.
In Rodgers v. Louisiana Board of Nursing, for example, had the
plaintiff sought an injunction prohibiting members of the board in
their official capacities from terminating her nursing program, she
might have satisfied Ex parte Young, and the suit (if it had substan-
tive merit) might have protected the students from harm.279 In fact,
if the court had entered a temporary injunction early in the
litigation, the students might not have suffered any cognizable
damages, and they would have recovered the costs of suit and
attorney’s fees.280 As Rodgers suggests, the kind of regulatory
conduct that would support an antitrust action against an arm of
the state will likely have continuing effects that the court can
enjoin.281
Finally, state law may serve as a check on anticompetitive state
agency behavior. Most states have antitrust laws similar to the
disgorgement as an antitrust remedy); FTC v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 37 (D.D.C.
1999) (holding that the FTC has authority to obtain monetary relief for antitrust violations).
But cf. Kokesh v. SEC, 137 S. Ct. 1635, 1643-44 (2017) (holding that disgorgement imposed
as a sanction for violating federal securities law is a “penalty” for purposes of the applicable
statute of limitations and thereby calling into question whether it is an authorized equitable
remedy under the antitrust laws).
277. See Clayton Act of 1914 §§ 4, 16, 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (2012).
278. See Clayton Act of 1914 § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26. Ex parte Young includes the judicial
power to impose attorney’s fees. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 279 (1989) (“[A]n
award of attorney’s fees ancillary to prospective relief is not subject to the strictures of the
Eleventh Amendment.”).
279. Cf. 665 F. App’x 326, 327, 330 (5th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); see supra note 278 and
accompanying text.
280. See Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 327-28; supra note 278 and accompanying text.
281. See Rodgers, 665 F. App’x at 330.
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federal antitrust laws.282 These laws, which are not preempted by
federal law,283 often mirror federal law in substance.284 They vary
among themselves and with federal law in their enforcement struc-
tures and the remedies they authorize.285 Moreover, anticompetitive
regulatory actions may be challenged under theories other than
antitrust, such as that they are ultra vires and therefore void.286
Importantly, the Eleventh Amendment does not affect the enforce-
ment of state law in state courts;287 for that matter, state action
immunity does not directly apply. Whether state law represents a
substantial bulwark against anticompetitive state administrative
action is debatable.288 But it may help fill the gaps in federal
antitrust enforcement created by the Eleventh Amendment.
CONCLUSION
The state action doctrine and the Eleventh Amendment both
provide a version of sovereign immunity from the federal antitrust
laws for state-connected anticompetitive conduct.289 But these
immunities have evolved separately, and they now vary in the scope
of their protection.290 State action immunity would leave some
conduct exposed to the full range of remedies available under the
antitrust statutes that the Eleventh Amendment protects. At first
glance, this enforcement gap would seem to create a substantial risk
that serious anticompetitive conduct will go undeterred, especially
because the state actors protected by the Eleventh Amendment
wield the power of the government in pursuing their objectives. On
closer examination, however, the risk proves modest. The Eleventh
Amendment itself does not preclude all remedies against state ac-
tors.291 It permits private injunctive actions against state officials
282. See WILLIAM T. LIFLAND, STATE ANTITRUST LAW § 1.02 (2017).
283. See California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989) (“Congress has not pre-
empted the field of antitrust law.”).
284. See LIFLAND, supra note 282, § 1.02.
285. See id. § 1.07.
286. See Page & Lopatka, supra note 32, at 213-14.
287. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
288. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 237, at 444-46.
289. See supra Part I.
290. See supra Parts I-II.
291. See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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and federal actions for any remedy against state governmental
entities and their officials.292 It does not preclude actions against
private antitrust violators enabled by state actors.293 It has nothing
to say about actions under state antitrust laws in state courts.294
Eleventh Amendment immunity, with all these limitations, seems
less costly than eliminating the immunity or eliminating its lim-
itations.
292. See supra Part I.B.
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See supra Part III.C.
